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W
I 
I. INTRODUCTION   
 
   
  ar crimes have been a consistent feature of the Syrian conflict since its 
inception. The Syrian people have been subjected to deliberate, indiscrimi-
nate, and disproportionate attacks; the misuse of conventional, unconven-
tional, and improvised weapons and weapon systems; industrial-grade cus-
todial abuses,1 including deaths in detention; unrelenting siege warfare; the 
denial of humanitarian aid and what appears to be the deliberate use of star-
vation as a weapon of war; sexual violence, including sexual enslavement of 
Yezidi women and girls and sexual torture of men and boys in detention; 
and the intentional destruction of cultural property. Thousands of Syrians 
have disappeared without a trace, many of them victims of enforced disap-
pearances. The emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Le-
vant/Daesh (ISIL) introduced a new set of ruthless perpetrators who have 
brought the violence to an even more alarming level of brutality. In addition 
to war crimes under international humanitarian law (IHL), the Syrian people 
have experienced other crimes under international criminal law, including 
crimes against humanity,2 summary execution, terrorism and, potentially, 
                                                                                                                      
1. Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Ar-
ab Republic, ¶ 82, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/58 (July 18, 2013) (finding torture to be “en-
demic” in Syrian prisons and detention centers). The Commission produced a chilling 
thematic report on deaths in detention—due both to torture as well as inhuman living 
conditions—throughout Syria, including in clandestine and makeshift detention centers 
established by non-State armed groups. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Out of Sight, Out 
of Mind: Deaths in Detention in the Syrian Arab Republic U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/CRP.1 (Feb. 
3, 2016), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A-HRC-3 
1-CRP1_en.pdf. The scale of these custodial abuses first came to light in photographs 
secreted from the country in 2013 by a former forensic photographer codenamed “Cae-
sar.” See Syria: Stories Behind Photos of Killed Detainees, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 16, 
2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/16/syria-stories-behind-photos-killed-detain 
ees. The U.S. FBI subsequently authenticated these photographs. Stav Ziv, Syria Torture 
Photos ‘Depict Real People and Events’: FBI Report, NEWSWEEK (July 22, 20-
15), http://www.newsweek.com/syria-torture-photos-depict-real-people-and-events-fbi -
report-356057. 
2. Crimes against humanity are a constellation of acts made criminal by international 
law when they are committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian 
population. Crimes against humanity can be charged regardless of whether there is an 
armed conflict and irrespective of the conflict’s classification. See Beth Van Schaack, The 
Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 787 (1999). 
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genocide against ethno-religious minorities.3 These extreme levels of vio-
lence, coupled with the lack of any apparent progress until very recently to-
ward reaching a political resolution of the conflict, have generated a massive 
refugee crisis in the region and beyond. More than 4.5 million people (out of 
a population of twenty-two million) have fled across Syria’s borders, more 
than seven million are internally displaced, and half the population needs 
humanitarian assistance in the form of food and/or shelter.4 The situation—
described in 2014 by U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper 
as an “apocalyptic disaster”—remains grave and continues to deteriorate, 
without an end in sight.5 
The Syrian conflict has one of the most well-documented international 
crime bases in history. Under the auspices of the U.N. Human Rights 
Council, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syr-
ian Arab Republic (COI) has been working to  
 
investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law since 
March 2011 in the Syrian Arab Republic, to establish the facts and cir-
cumstances that may amount to such violations and of the crimes perpe-
trated and, where possible, to identify those responsible with a view to 
ensuring that perpetrators of violations, including those that may consti-
tute crimes against humanity, are held accountable.6 
 
                                                                                                                      
3. See Beth Van Schaack, ISIL = Genocide?, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 29, 2014), https://w 
ww.Just Security.org/14435/isis-genocide/; European Parliament, Resolution on System-
atic Mass Murder of Religious Minorities by ISIS, EUR. PARL. DOC. P8_TA-PROV 
(2016)0051, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSG 
ML+TA+P8-TA-2016-0051+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN. The U.S. Holocaust Museum 
and Memorial documented the commission of genocide against the Yezidi people in 
northern Iraq. See NAOMI KIKOLER, “OUR GENERATION IS GONE”: THE ISLAMIC 
STATE’S TARGETING OF IRAQI MINORITIES IN NINEWA (2015), https://www.ushmm.org 
/m/pdfs/Iraq-Bearing-Witness-Report-111215.pdf.  
4. See SYRIA REGIONAL REFUGEE RESPONSE, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefu 
gees/regional.php (last visited Apr. 18, 2016); Syria IDP Figures Analysis, IDMC, http://ww 
w.internal-displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/syria/figures-analysis (last visit-
ed Apr. 18, 2016).  
5. Courtney Kube, Syria Crisis: “Apocalyptic Disaster,” Clapper Says, NBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 
2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/syria-crisis-apocalyptic-disaster-clapper-sa 
ys-n27466.  
6. Human Rights Council Res. S-17/1, Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab 
Republic, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-17/2 (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.lcil.cam.ac. 
uk/sites/default/files/LCIL/documents/arabspring/syria/Syria_32_Report_Human_Rig
hts_Council_17th_Special_Session.pdf.  
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Since its inception in 2011, the COI has issued multiple broad-spectrum 
and thematic reports, tracing the dramatic deterioration of the situation in 
Syria. Although the Assad regime has barred the Commission from under-
taking investigations in the country, the COI has managed to fulfil its mis-
sion through skype calls within Syria; interviews with refugees, defectors, 
and witnesses in the diaspora; secreted documents and postings on social 
media; and other investigative techniques. In addition to describing the pat-
terns of violence, it has also generated a list of perpetrators that remains 
under seal in Geneva.7 Alongside the COI, several fact-finding missions 
and investigative bodies convened by the U.N. Security Council and the 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) are track-
ing the use of chemical weapons in Syria8 and apportioning responsibility.9 
In the non-governmental sector, multiple international and Syrian docu-
mentation centers are securing potential evidence in digital vaults, churning 
out a steady stream of human rights reports,10 conducting statistical data 
analysis,11 and even compiling detailed dossiers on potential defendants for 
future prosecutions.12 From the grassroots, citizen journalists have upload-
ed millions of digital images and thousands of hours of footage of the car-
nage.13 Together, these documentation efforts have catalogued the com-
mission of almost every war crime known to humankind. The assumption 
is that this information will lay the groundwork for a whole range of transi-
                                                                                                                      
7. Raja Abdulrahim, Syria’s Bashir Assad Implicated in War Crimes, U.N. Rights Chief Says, 
LOS ANGELES TIMES (Dec. 2, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/02/world/la-
fg-wn-syria-bashar-assad-war-crimes-un-20131202; Stephanie Nebehay, War Crimes Evi-
dence in Syria Solid Enough for Indictment: U.N., REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.reut 
ers.com/article/us-syria-crisis-warcrimes-idUSBREA2H0PH20140318.  
8. See, e.g., Executive Council, OPCW, Reports of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria, 
EC-M-48/DEC.1 (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/M-48/ 
ecm48 dec01_e_.pdf.  
9. See S.C. Res. 2235 (Aug. 7, 2015).  
10. See, e.g., SYRIAN OBSERVATORY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.syriahr.com/ 
en/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2016).  
11. See, e.g., Syria, HRDAG, https://hrdag.org/syria/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2016).  
12. Mark Kersten, What Counts as Evidence of Syria’s War Crimes?, JUSTICE IN CON-
FLICT (Oct. 29, 2014) (describing the work of the Commission on International Justice 
and Accountability); Julian Borger, Syria’s Truth Smugglers, THE GUARDIAN (May 12, 20-
15), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/12/syria-truth-smugglers-bashar-al-
assad-war-crimes.  
13. Chloe Lowe, Syria: A War Reported by Citizen-Journalists, Social Media, RADIO FREE 
EUROPE (June 20, 2012), http://www.rferl.org/content/syria-war-reported-by-citizen-
journalists-social-media/24630841.html.  
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tional justice mechanisms—in the event that there is ever a transition—
including criminal accountability.  
There is a substantial body of international law governing the commis-
sion of war crimes in Syria. Legal guideposts include the Geneva Conven-
tions and their two Additional Protocols,14 the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC Statute),15 a suite of treaties dedicated to the 
use and prohibition of certain weapons,16 and the International Committee 
of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) monumental customary international law (CIL) 
study.17 Although the various IHL treaties are well-established and well-
subscribed to by States, they contain only rudimentary provisions on war 
crimes when committed in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), 
which is presumptively—but not definitively—how the conflict(s) in Syria 
would be characterized. Likewise, national penal codes and the ICC Statute 
do not codify all potential war crimes, particularly (and again) when it 
comes to acts of violence committed in NIACs. Because of gaps in the 
ICC Statute, the ICC Prosecutor would not be able to prosecute as war 
crimes many of the acts of violence that are so salient in the Syrian conflict, 
even if a referral to the ICC is forthcoming.18 This article thus advances the 
                                                                                                                      
14. See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; Protocol Addition to 
the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter API]; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 and Relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [here-
inafter APII].  
15. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter ICC Statute]. 
16. See IHL Treaties and the Regulation of Weapons, CANADIAN RED CROSS, http://ww 
w.redcross.ca/how-we-help/international-humanitarian-law/what-is-international-hum 
anitarian-law/weapons-and-international-humanitarian-law/ihl-treaties-and-the-regulation-
of-weapons (listing treaties and subject matter) (last visited May, 3, 2016).  
17. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & 
Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter ICRC CIL Study].  
18. Because Syria is not a party to the ICC Statute, the ICC would have plenary juris-
diction only in the event that the U.N. Security Council effectuates a referral of the situa-
tion in Syria to the Court. Otherwise, the ICC has jurisdiction only over potential crimes 
committed on the territory of Syria by nationals of ICC States Parties. ICC Statute, supra 
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claim that CIL retains a continuing primacy in determining accountability 
for war crimes. CIL, as a more unified body of law that does not depend so 
starkly on conflict classification, is critical to evaluating the legality of the 
actions of armed actors in Syria. Even CIL, however, contains ambiguities; 
in particular, it is often unclear when conduct that may be prohibited is also 
criminal under IHL.  
Notwithstanding the dogged documentation efforts and the extant legal 
framework, there has been no meaningful accountability for the abuses in 
Syria committed for want of two key predicates: jurisdiction and political 
will. If the latter emerges, the former could easily follow. A number of ju-
ridical options exist even absent a transition—domestic trials in third 
States, trials before an ad hoc tribunal dedicated to the conflict, and a refer-
ral to the ICC—that could be pursued alone, sequentially, or concurrently. 
Only an ad hoc tribunal premised on CIL, however, will have the potential 
to prosecute the full panoply of war crimes being committed in Syria.  
This article engages these issues in several parts. It begins by briefly 
presenting the international law framework applied to determine when an 
armed conflict began in Syria, how this conflict is classified under interna-
tional law, and which multilateral treaties and customary rules are applica-
ble. This framework will be utilized to determine which war crimes can be 
prosecuted, which tribunals might have jurisdiction, and which perpetrators 
may be made subject to indictment.19 The article focuses on some open 
legal and factual issues around certain potential war crimes that are particu-
larly salient in the Syrian conflict, but that have been under-theorized and 
rarely prosecuted.20 It demonstrates that many of these war crimes could 
not be easily prosecuted before the ICC or under any domestic war crimes 
                                                                                                                      
note 15, arts. 12–13. This includes foreign fighters from the United Kingdom and other 
ICC member States who have joined the fight. See Jennifer Trahan, New Paths to Accounta-
bility for Crimes in Syria and Iraq (Including ICC Jurisdiction over Foreign Fighters), JUST SECURITY 
(Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/17308/paths-accountability-crimes-syria-
iraq-including-icc-jurisdiction-foreign-fighters/. 
19. David Turns, The International Humanitarian Law Classification of Armed Conflicts in 
Iraq Since 2003, in THE WAR IN IRAQ: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 97, 98 (Raul (Pete) Pedrozo ed., 
2010) (Vol. 86, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies) (noting that the deter-
mination of the nature of an armed conflict has “very real significance for the military 
forces engaged in the conflict, for it impacts directly such practical military activities as the 
status of the participants, their consequent classification and treatment after capture by an 
opposing party, the conduct of hostilities and the use of weaponry”).  
20. This submission focuses primarily on the applicability of IHL and the war crimes 
prohibitions. Many of the crimes at issue could be prosecuted as crimes against humanity 
or even genocide.  
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statutes that hew closely to the IHL treaties, given the stark divergence be-
tween treaty law and CIL when it comes to NIACs in general and to prose-
cutable war crimes in particular. These observations offer support for pro-
posals to develop an ad hoc tribunal dedicated to the Syrian conflict, as 
sketched out in the final section. Taken together, the article illustrates the 
continued utility of CIL to ensure that evolutions in the law can be adjudi-
cated notwithstanding the tendency of treaties toward normative ossifica-
tion. 
 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK 
 
There is no definitive agreed-upon date for the initiation of the armed con-
flict within Syria—a necessary predicate21 for the prosecution of war 
crimes22 under IHL. The requirement to establish a starting date sets this 
class of crime apart from other international crimes (e.g., crimes against 
humanity and genocide) that do not depend upon the existence of an 
armed conflict.23 Most non-governmental and academic accounts place the 
start of the conflict in Syria sometime in late 2011 or early 2012. While 
these determinations constitute valuable sources of evidence,24 the applica-
bility of IHL ultimately depends on the facts on the ground and not all ob-
servers have had the requisite battlefield access. As a result, any court seek-
ing to adjudicate potential war crimes will need to conduct a detailed analy-
sis to determine when the IHL threshold was crossed and whether it has 
been crossed within Syria as a whole or within specific areas experiencing 
                                                                                                                      
21. Syria: Applicable International Law, RULAC, http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULA 
C/applicable_international_law.php?id_state=211 (last visited Apr. 18, 2016).  
22. How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law, ICRC 
(Mar. 2008), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict. 
pdf.  
23. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 107–19 (Ronald S. 
Slye & Beth Van Schaack eds., 2009) (discussing elements employed to internationalize 
crimes). 
24. For example, the Syrian COI estimated that the IHL threshold was crossed as ear-
ly as February 2012. Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on 
the Syrian Arab Republic, Annex II, ¶¶ 2–3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/50 (Aug. 16, 2012), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/
A-HRC-21-50_en.pdf. Prior to that point, the COI analyzed the violence in Syria with 
reference to human rights law and the prohibition against crimes against humanity. See, e.g., 
Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Re-
public, ¶¶ 101–8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1 (Nov. 23, 2011) (concluding that 
crimes against humanity may have been committed during the period under review).  
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armed violence.25 Indeed, there may have been pockets of armed conflict 
emerging in Rastan, Homs, Idlib, and elsewhere in the fall of 2011 that 
would trigger the applicability of IHL and, with it, the war crimes prohibi-
tions. Identifying the point at which IHL applied to the conflict will be 
crucial if borderline incidents are subject to prosecution, such as the appar-
ently deliberate attack on a media center in Homs on February 22, 2012.26 
The range of war crimes that may be charged in connection with any 
particular armed conflict is contingent on whether the conflict is an inter-
national armed conflict (IAC) or a NIAC. The Syrian conflict—really a web 
of conflicts—by and large implicates the law governing NIACs. (One ex-
ception is the long-time occupation of the Golan Heights, which remains 
governed by the Fourth Geneva Convention.)27 In terms of conflict classi-
fication, it is possible to identify several overlapping NIACs: conflicts pit-
ting the Assad regime against non-State opposition groups; the conflict be-
tween the Assad regime and al-Qaeda affiliates such as the al Nusra Front 
or the Khorasan Group; conflicts between competing opposition groups 
including the Kurdish People’s Protection Unit;28 and the conflicts between 
ISIL and all of the above.29 These NIAC determinations are not necessarily 
conclusive or permanent and may change as events on the ground evolve. 
Some observers, including the ICRC in its recent Commentary to Geneva 
Convention I, are increasingly willing to treat the use of armed force by 
                                                                                                                      
25. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion 
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 69 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia 
Oct. 2, 1995) (noting that the treaties, including Common Article 3, apply outside the 
“narrow geographic context of the actual theater of combat operations”). 
26. See Peter Beaumont, Were Marie Colvin and Journalists Deliberately Targeted by Syria’s 
Army?, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/feb/ 
23/marie-colvin-journalists-targeted-syria. War correspondent Marie Colvin died in this 
attack. As a U.S. citizen, her death could be prosecuted as a war crime under the U.S. War 
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §2441.  
27. Occupied Golan: ICRC Mitigates Some Effects of Occupation, ICRC (Mar. 2, 2010), https: 
//www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/update/israel-golan-update-020310.htm; Jodi 
Rudoren, As Syria Reels, Israel Looks to Expand Settlements in Golan Heights, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/03/world/middleeast/syria-
civil-war-israel-golan-heights.html?_r=0. See S.C. Res. 497, paras. 1–3 (Dec. 17, 1981) (de-
termining the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Golan Heights). 
28. See Guide to the Syrian Rebels, BBC (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
world-middle-east-24403003.  
29. See CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33487, 
ARMED CONFLICT IN SYRIA: OVERVIEW AND U.S. RESPONSE (Oct. 9, 2015), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33487.pdf. See Terry D. Gill, Classifying the Con-
flict in Syria, 92 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES (2016) (forthcoming).  
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one State in the territory of another State without the latter’s consent as an 
IAC, even if the armed forces of the two States are not directly embattled.30 
Under this approach, once the U.S. coalition began to engage ISIL in Syria 
without Syrian consent the conflict transformed into an IAC.   
There is little treaty law—as distinct from CIL—governing the com-
mission of war crimes in Syria. The foundational treaties devoted to regu-
lating the means and methods of warfare, the 1899 and 1907 Hague Con-
ventions and their annexes, apply only to IACs and do not contain penal 
provisions.31 The 1949 Geneva Conventions (designating so-called grave 
breaches that are subject to universal criminal jurisdiction32) protect certain 
vulnerable classes of person—such as civilians and prisoners of war—but 
they also apply for the most part to IACs.33 Common Article 3 of those 
treaties governs all NIACs, but does not designate its list of prohibitions as 
crimes per se.34 Syria has not ratified Additional Protocol II (APII), which 
                                                                                                                      
30. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY TO GENEVA 
CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND 
SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶ 237 (2d ed. 2016), https://www.icrc.org/a 
pplic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=BE2D518CF5DE
54EAC1257F7D0036B518 - 66_B (“Any unconsented-to military operations by one State 
in the territory of another State should be interpreted as an armed interference in the lat-
ter’s sphere of sovereignty and thus may be an international armed conflict under Article 
2(1).”); id. at ¶ 260 (“Should the third State’s intervention be carried out without the con-
sent of the territorial State, it would amount to an international armed conflict between 
the intervening State and the territorial State.”).  
31. See, e.g., Convention No. II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. 403; Regulations Respecting the Laws and Cus-
toms of War on Land, annexed to Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regula-
tions]. 
32. Universal Jurisdiction over War Crimes, ICRC (Mar. 2014), https://www.icrc.org/eng/ 
assets/files/2014/universal-jurisdiction-icrc-eng.pdf. 
33. Grave Breaches Specified in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and in Additional Protocol I of 
1977, ICRC (Jan. 31, 1998), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jp2 
a.htm.  
34. Common Article 3 provides:  
 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of 
one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as 
a minimum, the following provisions:  
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces 
who have laid down their arms and those placed ‘hors de combat’ by sickness, wounds, 
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any 
adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any 
other similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any 
time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: 
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amplifies the treaty law governing certain NIACs that involve violence be-
tween governmental forces and armed non-State actors (but not violence 
between different non-State actors) and some showing of territorial control 
and operational acumen by rebel forces.35 Additional Protocol I (API)—
which Syria ratified in 1983—melds the Geneva Conventions’ grave 
breaches regime with the Hague Conventions’ rules on means and meth-
ods, but it applies only to IACs, defined in Article 1 to include those in-
volving people “fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation 
and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-
determination.”36 Although some opposition movements have in the past 
agreed to be bound by API via declarations issued under Article 96(3),37 
this idiosyncratic standard has rarely, if ever, been formally applied in prac-
tice and may or may not encompass armed conflicts—like the one in Syr-
ia—fought to unseat an authoritarian regime.38  
                                                                                                                      
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment 
and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages; 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which 
are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. 
 
See, e.g., Geneva Convention IV, supra note 14. 
35. According to Article 1 of APII, the treaty applies to  
 
all armed conflicts which are not covered by [Protocol I] and which take place in the terri-
tory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or 
other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control 
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and to implement this Protocol. 
 
36. According to Article 1 of API, the treaty applies to armed conflicts governed by 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and  
 
armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occu-
pation and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as en-
shrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
37. This provision states, “The authority representing a people engaged against a High 
Contracting Party in an armed conflict of the type referred to in Article 1 . . . may under-
take to apply the Conventions and this Protocol in relation to that conflict by means of a 
unilateral declaration addressed to the depositary.” 
38. Noelle Higgins, The Application of International Humanitarian Law to Wars of National 
Liberation, JOURNAL OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (2004), http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/ 
files/2011/04/a132.pdf.  
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Because of the limitations of these treaties, most of the analysis below 
of particular war crimes will rely upon CIL, which now penalizes many 
breaches of IHL—even those first articulated in treaties that do not con-
ceptualize violations of their terms as criminal conduct—regardless of 
whether they are committed in an IAC or a NIAC.39 Thus, although the 
Hague Conventions, Common Article 3, and APII contain no express war 
crimes provisions, many violations of their terms now give rise to individu-
al criminal responsibility across the conflict spectrum as a matter of CIL. In 
1998, the drafters of the ICC Statute went a long way toward collapsing the 
distinction between NIACs and IACs in Article 8, the war crimes provi-
sion. This article invites the prosecution of (a) grave breaches of the Gene-
va Conventions (Article 8(2)(a)) in IACs; (b) certain serious violations of 
Common Article 3 committed against persons taking no active part in a 
NIAC (Article 8(2)(c)); and (c) other enumerated violations of the laws and 
customs of war that are applicable in IACs (Article 8(2)(b)) and NIACs 
(Article 8(2)(e)). The latter provisions depart significantly from APII’s 
scope of application in that they are triggered by situations in which “there 
is protracted armed conflict” between a State and non-State groups or be-
tween non-State groups, without requiring a showing of territorial control, 
responsible command, or the ability to conduct sustained operations.40 Ar-
ticle 8(2)(e)’s list of war crimes is exhaustive, however, and the ICC is gov-
erned by a strong articulation of the principle of legality (nullum crimen since 
lege), which prohibits the prosecution of anyone for an act that was not 
criminal at the time it was committed, so there is little room for expansion 
or innovation.41  
As will be discussed in greater detail below, the ICC Statute’s listing of 
acts constituting war crimes remains more extensive for IACs as compared 
                                                                                                                      
39. See ICRC CIL Study, supra note 17, r. 156; Sarah Cleveland, Harmonizing Standards 
in Armed Conflict, EJIL: TALK! (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.ejiltalk.org/harmonizing-
standards-in-armed-conflict/. 
40. According to Article 8(2)(4):  
 
Paragraph 2 (e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does 
not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that 
take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between gov-
ernmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups. 
 
For APII’s scope of application, see supra notes 35 and 36.  
41. See ICC Statute, supra note 15, art. 22(2) (“The definition of a crime shall be strict-
ly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition 
shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.”).  
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to NIACs, even taking into account the 2010 amendments that sought to 
partially harmonize the two regimes’ treatment of weapons crimes.42 Thus, 
if an ICC referral is ever forthcoming, conflict classification will remain 
relevant with respect to prosecutable war crimes, including many that have 
come to define the Syrian conflict.43 Likewise, if the only courts available to 
prosecute war crimes in Syria are domestic courts, they too may have a lim-
ited reach, because individual States may not have codified the full range of 
war crimes with respect to NIACs.44 If members of the international com-
munity or a regional body ever establish an ad hoc tribunal dedicated to 
this conflict, these juridical architects will enjoy greater license to expand 
the list of prosecutable war crimes to better reflect violations on the 
ground and contemporary CIL.  
With this in mind, the following section will explore the law governing 
some defining features of the potential war crimes being committed in the 
Syrian conflict with reference to IHL treaties, the ICC Statute, and CIL 
prohibitions. The ICRC’s CIL study, the jurisprudence of international 
criminal tribunals,45 and pronouncements of the Security Council, Human 
Rights Council and other multilateral bodies will be looked to as the 
sources of CIL.46 Of particular note is Rule 156 of the CIL study,47 which 
contains an extensive list of war crimes considered by the ICRC to be part 
of CIL. Even this list, however, remains somewhat indeterminate when it 
comes to NIACs. There are certain instances in the CIL study in which the 
ICRC identifies a prohibition under IHL as applicable across the conflict 
spectrum, but has not yet confirmed an international consensus in terms of 
State practice and opinio juris, the two components of CIL, on whether the 
breach of such a prohibition constitutes a prosecutable war crime. 
 
                                                                                                                      
42. See infra text accompanying notes 132–33.  
43. On ICC referrals, see supra note 18.  
44. American University Washington College of Law’s War Crimes Research Office 
has conducted a detailed analysis of national war crimes legislation. See Universal Jurisdiction 
over War Crimes, WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, https://www.wcl.american.edu/war 
crimes/documents/2013-05-16UJChart.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2016).  
45. See Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the International Criminal 
Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 1 (2006). 
46. See Marko Divac Öberg, The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and 
General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 879 (2006).  
47. Rule 156 of the CIL study lists those war crimes it deems to be part of CIL.  
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III. WAR CRIMES IN SYRIA 
 
A. Deliberate, Indiscriminate, and Disproportionate Attacks on Civilians  
 
The foundational IHL principle of distinction, which underlies a number 
of war crimes, requires all parties to a conflict to distinguish between lawful 
and unlawful targets.48 The law governing the direct targeting of civilians, 
civilian objects, and other protected persons and things is relatively 
straightforward and applies across the conflict spectrum. These prohibi-
tions would enable the prosecution of those responsible for deliberate at-
tacks on bakeries and markets in opposition-controlled territory.49 These 
rules would also enable the prosecution of those who deliberately target 
hospitals or medical personnel,50 which enjoy special protection under 
IHL,51 and journalists, who increasingly do too.52 All these crimes could 
                                                                                                                      
48. Key rules from the ICRC CIL study include Rule 1 (“The parties to the conflict 
must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be di-
rected against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians.”); Rule 7 (“The 
parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilian objects and military 
objectives. Attacks may only be directed against military objectives. Attacks must not be 
directed against civilian objects.”); Rule 10 (“Civilian objects are protected against attack, 
unless and for such time as they are military objectives.”). Rule 156 treats violations of 
these rules as war crimes.  
49. See Ole Solvang & Anna Neistat, Death from the Skies, Deliberate and Indiscriminate Air 
Strikes on Civilians, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 10, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/report 
/2013/04/10/death-skies/deliberate-and-indiscriminate-air-strikes-civilians. Civilians and 
others who are hors de combat are also protected from mistreatment while in formal and 
informal detention. Priyanka Motaparthy & Nadim Houry, If the Dead Could Speak: Mass 
Deaths and Torture in Syria’s Detention Facilities, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 16, 2015), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/12/16/if-dead-could-speak/mass-deaths-and-torture-
syrias-detention-facilities. 
50. Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian 
Arab Republic 10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/68 (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.ohchr.org/D 
ocuments/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A-HRC-31-68.pdf (“The targeting of hospi-
tals, medical personnel and transport, and the denial of access to medical care remain an 
ingrained feature of the Syrian conflict.”). Russia has also been implicated in such attacks. 
See Russia Rejects Syria War Crimes Claim over Hospital Attacks, BBC (Feb. 16, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35586886.  
51. It is unlawful to deliberately target a hospital, even one treating combatants who 
are considered hors de combat and thus immune from deliberate attack, unless it is being 
used for non-medical military purposes such that it has lost its protection. See ICRC CIL 
Study, supra note 17, r. 35 (“Directing an attack against a zone established to shelter the 
wounded, the sick and civilians from the effects of hostilities is prohibited.”); id., r. 156; 
ICC Statute, supra note 15, arts. 8(2)(b)(ix), 8(2)(e)(iv) (listing the crime of intentionally 
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easily be prosecuted by the ICC or under most domestic war crimes stat-
utes, so long as the latter penalized such crimes when committed in NI-
ACs. Beyond such direct and deliberate attacks, however, the ICC Statute’s 
war crimes provisions diverge from CIL and depend in meaningful ways on 
conflict classification. National penal codes that hew closely to the terms of 
the IHL treaties will contain similar limitations.  
These omissions in the ICC Statute generate some conspicuous gaps 
when it comes to war crimes. For example, the ICC cannot prosecute the 
crime of deliberately inflicting terror among the civilian population, even 
though this crime has a strong treaty basis in both IACs53 and NIACs54 and 
in CIL.55 (Inexplicably, it is not specifically included in Rule 156, either). 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
Prosecutor generally employed this prohibition to charge those responsible 
for attacking populated areas, particularly when there were limited civilian 
                                                                                                                      
directing attacks on “hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected” as 
prosecutable in IACs and NIACs). 
52. Beth Van Schaack, Attacks on Journalists a War Crime, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 20, 
2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/14179/attacks-journalists-war-crime/; ICRC CIL 
Study, supra note 17, r. 34 (“Civilian journalists engaged in professional missions in areas 
of armed conflict must be respected and protected as long as they are not taking a direct 
part in hostilities.”). In 2006, the Security Council approved a resolution dedicated to the 
protection of journalists. See S.C. Res. 1738 (Dec. 22, 2006). In response to the deliberate 
targeting of journalists in Syria, the General Assembly issued Resolution 68/163 con-
demning such attacks and urging States to bring perpetrators to justice. G.A. Res. 68/163 
(Feb. 21, 2014). See also Human Rights Council Res. 26/23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/ 
RES/26/23, ¶ 7 (June 27, 2014) (decrying attacks on journalists). 
53. Article 51(2) of API states: “The civilian population as such, as well as individual 
civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose 
of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.” The treaty at 
Article 85(3)(a) designates this offense as a grave breach giving rise to individual criminal 
responsibility. 
54. Article 13(2) of APII is identical to API Article 51(2). This charge has been de-
scribed as an “amplification of the absolute prohibition on attacking civilians and the pro-
hibition on indiscriminate attacks.” K.J. Riordan, Shelling, Sniping and Starvation: The Law of 
Armed Conflict and the Lessons of the Siege of Sarajevo, 41 VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLING-
TON LAW REVIEW 149, 165 (2010).  
55. ICRC CIL Study, supra note 17, art. 2 (“Acts or threats of violence the primary 
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.”). The 
statutes of the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda (Article 4(d)) and Sierra Leone 
(Article 3(d)) both allowed for the prosecution of the war crime of “acts of terrorism.” See, 
e.g., Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 3(d), Jan.16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 
145.  
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2016 
296 
 
 
 
 
 
 
deaths.56 In ruling on these charges, the ICTY confirmed that the actual 
infliction of death or serious bodily harm is not a required element of the 
crime of inflicting terror on the civilian population;57 what matters is that 
the defendant acted with the intent to spread terror.58 This crime was 
deemed separate and distinct from the counts alleging the commission of 
unlawful attacks against civilians, including direct, indiscriminate, and dis-
proportionate attacks.59  
Similarly, the crime of attacking an undefended site60 can only be pros-
ecuted before the ICC in IACs (Article 8(2)(b)(v)).61 For an area to be con-
sidered undefended according to Article 59 of API, armed actors must re-
move all combatants and weaponry from the area, “no hostile use shall be 
made of fixed military installations or establishments,” and “no activities in 
support of military operations shall be undertaken” in the area to ensure its 
legal protection.62 These standards, which generally exclude sites behind an 
active front line, are relatively difficult to meet in modern warfare, which 
                                                                                                                      
56. See Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 86–138 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Galić Trial Judgment] (finding 
the crime of terror to have formed part of CIL at the time the defendants acted). 
57. Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 
33 (Int’l. Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 12, 2009). 
58. Id. ¶ 37. 
59. Id. ¶ 39. 
60. In armed conflicts of the past, heavily populated urban areas were at times de-
clared to be “open cities,” which is to say that they were, in essence, undefended and im-
mune from direct attack. See Riordan, supra note 54, at 153. Such localities were deemed 
“open” in the sense that they were susceptible to occupation by an adverse party. Article 
59 of API provides that a belligerent may declare as a “non-defended locality any inhabit-
ed place near or in a zone where armed forces are in contact which is open for occupation 
by an adverse Party.”  
61. The 1907 Hague Regulations provides that “[t]he attack or bombardment, by 
whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended is prohibit-
ed.” Hague Regulations, supra note 31, art. 25. Attacking an undefended area is also a 
prosecutable war crime under the U.S. War Crimes Act, which incorporates this provision. 
18 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(2) (2006). 
62. Making an undefended locality and demilitarized zones the object of attack is a 
grave breach under API (Article 85(3)(d)), but not APII which contains no penal re-
gime.  
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may explain why this crime has rarely been prosecuted.63 The CIL study 
includes this crime in Rule 156, regardless of conflict classification.64 
This bifurcation between treaty law and CIL, and between crimes pros-
ecutable in IACs versus NIACs, is also apparent when it comes to the pe-
nal law governing indiscriminate,65 and disproportionate66 attacks, both of 
which find expression in Rule 156. The former involves attacks that are not 
directed at a specific military objective or that involve a method or means 
of warfare that cannot be directed at a military objective or whose effects 
cannot be limited.67 The prohibition against area bombardment,68 applica-
ble under CIL in IACs and NIACs, is a distinct subset of indiscriminate 
attack.69 Disproportionate attacks are those that generate “incidental loss of 
                                                                                                                      
63. William J. Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a Punishable Offense, 7 DUKE 
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 539, 549–50 (1997).  
64. See also ICRC CIL Study, supra note 17, r. 37 (“Directing an attack against a non-
defended locality is prohibited” regardless of conflict classification”).  
65. Indiscriminate attacks are defined as those: 
 
(a) which are not directed at a specific military objective; 
(b) which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a spe-
cific military objective; or 
(c) which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be lim-
ited as required by international humanitarian law; 
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and 
civilians or civilian objects without distinction. 
 
Id., r. 12.  
66. Id., r. 14 (“Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss 
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage an-
ticipated, is prohibited.”). 
67. Article 52 of API defines “military objectives” as “those objects which by their 
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and 
whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at 
the time, offers a definite military advantage.” 
68. ICRC CIL Study, supra note 17, r. 13 (“Attacks by bombardment by any method 
or means which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and dis-
tinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar 
concentration of civilians or civilian objects is prohibited.”) 
69. This prohibition is implicated by recent campaign calls to “carpet bomb” ISIL. 
Pamela Engel, Ted Cruz Doubles Down on Vow to “Carpet Bomb” ISIS, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/ted-cruz-isis-carpet-bomb-strategy-
2016-1. Although not a term of art, the concept of carpet bombing is generally understood 
to mean an indiscriminate attack against a large area without regard to the presence of 
civilians or civilian objects. Even if it were lawful, the practice would be senseless and 
wasteful in the era of precision guided munitions. See Danielle L. Infeld, Precision-Guided 
Munitions Demonstrated Their Pinpoint Accuracy in Desert Storm; But is a Country Obligated to Use 
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civilian life and damage to civilian objects [that is] excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”70  
Under the ICC Statute, disproportionate attacks can be prosecuted only 
when committed within an IAC.71 Of even greater import for events in Syr-
ia, the ICC Statute contains no provision criminalizing indiscriminate at-
tacks—regardless of conflict classification. As such, when it comes to NI-
ACs, the ICC Prosecutor can only charge intentional attacks on civilians 
and civilian objects. These gaps in the ICC regime have implications for the 
Court’s ability to prosecute a range of crimes being committed in Syria, in-
cluding those involving unconventional, improvised, and prohibited weap-
ons and weapon systems in the absence of sufficient evidence establishing 
that civilians were directly targeted.  
 
B. Unconventional and Improvised Weapons and Weapon Systems 
 
IHL is premised on the idea that the means and methods of warfare are 
not without limit. This principle finds expression in general prohibitions 
applicable in all conflicts against the use of weapons and other methods of 
warfare that cannot be directed at a military objective72 or that are of a na-
                                                                                                                      
Precision Technology to Minimize Collateral Civilian Injury and Damage?, 26 GEORGE WASHING-
TON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 109 (1992). 
70. API, Article 57, indicates that an attack must be suspended if it becomes apparent 
that 
 
the objective is not a military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may 
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated.  
 
See Prosecutor v. Gotovina and Markač, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Appeals Chamber Judg-
ment, ¶¶ 64–67 (Int’l. Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 2012) (overturning 
the Trial Chamber’s findings that defendants orchestrated indiscriminate attacks in a Ser-
bian separatist entity in Croatia). For a cogent critique of this verdict and its underlying 
reasoning, see Marko Milanovic, The Gotovina Omnishambles, EJIL: TALK! (Nov. 18, 2012), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-gotovina-omnishambles/.  
71. ICC Statute, supra note 15, art. 8(2)(b)(iv) (Allowing the prosecution of “inten-
tionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of 
life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.”). 
72. ICRC CIL Study, supra note 17, r. 71 (“The use of weapons which are by nature 
indiscriminate is prohibited.”). 
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ture to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering,73 as well as in 
more specific bans or limits on the use of particular weapons and weapon 
systems. Many of the underlying IHL treaties dedicated to the use of identi-
fied weapons adopt a regulatory or disarmament—rather than a penal—
paradigm and apply only to IACs.74 As such, prosecutions would need to 
proceed under CIL or under more general IHL rules prohibiting direct, 
indiscriminate, disproportionate, or terror attacks against the civilian popu-
lation or those prohibiting the infliction of unnecessary suffering. The CIL 
study includes the use of prohibited weapons as a CIL war crime in both 
IACs and NIACs,75 although there is some equivocation over which weap-
ons are per se forbidden for lack of a clear international consensus.76  
The IHL rules on weapons can be particularly important because they 
protect combatants and other armed actors who may be the object of at-
tack, as well as civilians who may not be the object of attack unless they 
directly participate in hostilities. As discussed below, some weapons and 
weapon systems in use in Syria are inherently unlawful and indiscriminate; 
others are being used in ways that cannot possibly discriminate between the 
civilian population and civilian objects and combatants and military objec-
tives; still others cause unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury.77 The 
                                                                                                                      
73. ICRC CIL Study, supra note 17, r. 70. The concept of “unnecessary suffering” has 
been defined by the International Court of Justice as “a harm greater than that unavoida-
ble to achieve legitimate military objectives.” Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8).  
74. Three weapons conventions apply expressly to NIACs. See Convention on Prohi-
bitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be 
Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 
1342 U.N.T.S. 137; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. I, Jan. 13, 1993, 
1974 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter CWC]; Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpil-
ing, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 
1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211. The Conventional Weapons Convention, which was amended in 
2001 to apply to NIACs, is accompanied by five protocols that apply to particular weap-
ons, weapon features and weapon systems: weapons employing undetectable fragments, 
landmines and booby-traps, incendiary weapons, blinding lasers, and explosive remnants 
of war.  
75. See ICRC CIL Study, supra note 17, rr. 70–86. 
76. See id., r. 70.  
77. Suha Maayeh & Phil Sands, From Dumb Bombs to Precision Weapons, Assad Regime 
Ramps Up Airstrikes on Rebels, THE NATIONAL (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.the nation-
al.ae/world/middle-east/from-dumb-bombs-to-precision-weapons-assad-regime-ramps-
up-airstrikes-on-rebels (noting the use of more precise weaponry by the regime, presuma-
bly due to Russian upgrades).  
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use of chemical weapons in particular, which are subject to an absolute ban 
under international law, highlights the disjuncture between the ICC Statute 
and CIL. There is little precedent for the prosecution of weapons crimes; 
the use of all these prohibited and problematic weapons in Syria offers an 
opportunity to generate modern jurisprudence concerning these munitions 
if war crimes prosecutions are forthcoming. 
 
1. Barrel Bombs  
 
The warring parties in Syria have deployed a number of munitions that by 
design or in their usage are incapable of distinguishing between civilians 
and combatants, or between civilian objects and military objectives. For 
example, barrages of barrel bombs have come to represent the brutality of 
the Assad regime.78 These improvised containers are filled with bulk explo-
sives, incendiaries, and fragmentation media, and then dropped from heli-
copters and other aircraft.79 There are also indications that chemical agents, 
such as chlorine, have been included within these encasements80 and that 
their release has been sequenced in such a way as to maximize the impact 
on first responders.81  
Although there is no treaty or CIL rule governing barrel bombs per se, 
the COI invoked the IAC/NIAC customary prohibition against indiscrim-
inate attacks, specifically the ban on area bombardment, in condemning 
their use. In particular, it concluded that the use of barrel bombs 
in “densely populated areas with high concentrations of civilians” amount-
ed to “area bombardment,” a form of indiscriminate attack specifically 
                                                                                                                      
78. According to the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights, Syrian regime helicopters 
have dropped over 22,000 barrel bombs. The Russian Air Force Kill 403 Civilians, including 
166 Women and Children, and about 7000 Civilians Killed in 13 Months of Airstrikes Carried out by 
the Regime Air Forces, SOHR (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=38346. 
79. Eliot Higgins, A Brief Open Source History of the Syrian Barrel Bomb, BELLIN¿CAT (July 
8, 2015), https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2015/07/08/a-brief-open-source-hist 
ory-of-the-syrian-barrel-bomb/.  
80. Mohammed Najib & Jeremy Binnie, Syrian Pilot Details Helicopter Operations, IHS 
JANE’S 360 (July 12, 2015), http://www.janes.com/article/52910/syrian-pilot-details-hel 
icopter-operations.  
81. Clarissa Ward, White Helmets: Inside Look at Syria’s First Responders, CBS NEWS (Mar. 
16, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/white-helmets-inside-look-at-syrias-first-respo 
nders/.  
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prohibited under IHL, and that the “bombardments spread terror among 
the civilian population.”82  
 The use of barrel bombs has also generated widespread condemnation 
in the Security Council and elsewhere.83 In Resolution 2139, for example, 
the Council demanded  
 
that all parties immediately cease all attacks against civilians, as well as the 
indiscriminate employment of weapons in populated areas, including 
shelling and aerial bombardment, such as the use of barrel bombs, and 
methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering.84  
 
The Resolution also called for an end to impunity for all violations of IHL 
and reaffirmed that those who committed or were otherwise responsible 
for the violations “be brought to justice.”85 It tasked the Secretary-General 
to report on the implementation of this and related resolutions aimed at 
curbing abuses in Syria. In his twenty-first such report, the Secretary-
General concluded that indiscriminate attacks, including the use of barrel 
                                                                                                                      
82. Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian 
Arab Republic, Annex VI, ¶ 4, A/HRC/25/65 (Feb. 12, 2014). See also Human Rights 
Council Res. 26/23, supra note 52, ¶ 7 (declaring that the “indiscriminate use of barrel 
bombs” may amount to a war crime or a crime against humanity). 
83. In November, the Third Committee, with broad international support, tabled a 
resolution that, inter alia, strongly condemned  
 
all violations and abuses of international human rights law and all violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law committed against the civilian population, in particular all indis-
criminate attacks, including the use of barrel bombs in civilian areas and against civilian in-
frastructure, and demands that all parties immediately demilitarize medical facilities and 
schools and comply with their obligations under international law. 
 
Social, Humanitarian & Cultural Committee, Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Ar-
ab Republic, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/70/L.47 (Nov. 2, 2015). It also demanded the cessa-
tion of “all indiscriminate attacks in civilian areas and public spaces, including those in-
volving the use of terror tactics, airstrikes, barrel and vacuum bombs, chemical weapons 
and heavy artillery.” Id. ¶ 2. See also Human Rights Council Res. 29/L.4, ¶ 7 U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/29/L.4 (June 29, 2015).  
84. S.C. Res. 2139 (Feb. 22, 2014). 
85. Id., ¶ 13. Later, in Resolution 2165, the Security Council voiced “grave alarm in 
particular at the continuing indiscriminate attacks in populated areas, including an intensi-
fied campaign of aerial bombings and the use of barrel bombs in Aleppo and other areas.” 
S.C. Res. 2165, pmbl., para. 10 (July 14, 2014). 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2016 
302 
 
 
 
 
 
 
bombs, remain prevalent, despite Syrian assurances to the contrary.86 The 
Assad regime has consistently disavowed their use; however, recovered cell 
phone videos have disproved these denials.87 Notwithstanding these de-
nunciations, the attacks continue.88  
There is some relevant legal precedent attesting to the illegality of bar-
rel bombs. For instance, the ICTY Appeals Chamber affirmed Dragomir 
Milošević’s guilt of “acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of 
which is to spread terror among the civilian population” based on his order 
to use “modified air bombs” against civilians during the siege of Sarajevo.89 
The ICTY noted that these were “a highly inaccurate weapon, sometimes 
even described as uncontrollable, yet with extremely high explosive 
force.”90 Milošević was also charged with conducting a coordinated cam-
paign of sniper and shelling attacks against the civilian population of Sara-
jevo amounting to the crimes against humanity of murder and inhumane 
acts, as well as the war crime of committing an “unlawful attack against 
civilians.”91 
 
2. Cluster Munitions 
 
Cluster munitions have been air-dropped and ground-launched by Syrian 
forces (since mid-2012) and by ISIL (since late 2014) in multiple opposi-
tion-controlled locations around Syria.92 Human Rights Watch has record-
ed the use of advanced Russian-made cluster munitions following Russia’s 
                                                                                                                      
86. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Imple-
mentation of Security Council Resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), and 2191 (2014), 
U.N. Doc. S/2015/862 (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc. 
asp?symbol=S/2015/862 [hereinafter Secretary-General Report].  
87. Kayla Ruble, Newly Discovered Video Allegedly “Exposes Assad’s Lies on Barrel Bombs,” 
VICE NEWS (May 21, 2015), https://news.vice.com/article/newly-discovered-video-
allegedly-exposes-assads-lies-on-barrel-bombs.  
88. Syria: New Spate of Barrel Bomb Attacks, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 24, 2015), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/02/24/syria-new-spate-barrel-bomb-attacks.  
89. Milošević, supra note 57, ¶ 273. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. ¶ 4. 
92. Technical Briefing Note: Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(Apr. 4, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/04/technical-briefing-note-use-
cluster-munitions-syria. Human Rights Watch has not yet documented the use of cluster 
munitions by opposition groups, which do not operate aircraft. See Russia/Syria: Extensive 
Recent Use of Cluster Munitions, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 20, 2015), https://www. 
hrw.org/news/2015/12/20/russia/syria-extensive-recent-use-cluster-munitions.  
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September 2015 intervention, suggesting either that Russia is using cluster 
munitions itself or is providing them to the Syrian air force.93 There is no 
indication that the U.S.-led coalition has used cluster munitions in Opera-
tion Inherent Resolve, although these weapons were deployed—not with-
out controversy—in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999,94 in Oper-
ation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001 and onward,95 and in Op-
eration Iraqi Freedom in 2003.96  
Cluster munitions are weapons that eject a payload of sub-munitions 
(bomblets or other fragmentation elements) from a dispenser upon contact 
or at a preset altitude. They are classified as combined effect munitions be-
cause their payload may exert anti-material, anti-armor, anti-personnel, and 
incendiary effects. When unguided, cluster munitions are relatively inaccu-
rate, manifesting a high lateral error factor. Even when guided by the addi-
tion of a tail kit or infrared imager, they can generate a wide lethal radius 
since they distribute their sub-munitions over a large “footprint,” particu-
larly when fired from a distance or from higher altitudes. Cluster munitions 
are intended for use in wide-area targeting, and may be deployed against 
moving “soft” targets (enemy personnel and civilians) or to destroy run-
ways, scatter landmines, penetrate armor, start fires, and deliver chemical 
                                                                                                                      
93. Syria: New Russian-Made Cluster Munition Reported, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 
10, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/10/syria-new-russian-made-cluster-mun 
ition-reported; Russia/Syria: Daily Cluster Munitions Attacks, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 
8, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/08/russia/syria-daily-cluster-munition-att 
acks. A Russian watchdog group is in accord, notwithstanding Russian denials. Ruslan 
Leviev, Sputnik, RT and Russian MoD Expose Cluster Bombs at Hmeymim Airbase, CONFLICT 
INTELLIGENCE TEAM (Jan. 7, 2016), https://citeam.org/sputnik-rt-and-russian-mod-expo 
se-cluster-bombs-at-hmeimim-airbase/.  
94. See Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the 
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ¶ 27, 39 INTER-
NATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1257 (June 13, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press 
/nato061300.pdf [hereinafter Final Report] (concluding that the use of unguided cluster 
bombs by NATO forces did not merit further investigation, despite some civilian deaths); 
NATO’s Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 11, 1999), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/1999/05/11/natos-use-cluster-munitions-yugoslavia.  
95. Cluster Munitions in Afghanistan, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 2001), https://ww 
w.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/arms/cluster-bck1031.pdf.  
96. U.S. Using Cluster Munitions in Iraq, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 1, 2003), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2003/04/01/us-using-cluster-munitions-iraq.  
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weapons.97 A major critique of cluster bomb use concerns the fact that up 
to 30 percent of the payload may not detonate, generating so-called unex-
ploded ordinance (UXO) that can cause harm many years after initial use.98 
In Syria, hundreds of civilians have been killed by cluster munitions,99 alt-
hough precise data collection is inherently difficult and casualty numbers 
are probably higher than reported, especially once injuries from UXO are 
taken into account.  
No complete international consensus has yet emerged that the use of 
cluster munitions is per se unlawful under IHL, although some States, aca-
demics, and activists have argued otherwise, and the law is certainly moving 
in this direction.100 Almost one hundred States, including many members of 
the coalition conducting operations in Syria and Iraq, have joined the 2008 
Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), which bans the use of cluster 
munitions, requires the destruction of stockpiles, calls for the clearance of 
areas contaminated with unexploded sub-munitions and obliges parties to 
discourage the use of such munitions and provide assistance to victims.101 
The main producers and users of cluster munitions (the United States, Rus-
sia, India, Israel, Pakistan, China, and South Korea), however, have not 
                                                                                                                      
97. ANDREW FEICKERT & PAUL K. KERR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22907, CLUS-
TER MUNITIONS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 2 (Apr. 29, 2014), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22907.pdf.  
98. Starting in 2018, the United States will only procure and use cluster munitions 
with a less than 1 percent failure rate in the field. Memorandum from Robert Gates, Secre-
tary of Defense to Secretaries of the Military Departments et al., DoD Policy on Cluster 
Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians (June 19, 2008), http://www.global securi-
ty.org/military/library/policy/dod/d20080709cmpolicy.htm. Protocol V to the Conven-
tional Weapons Convention sought to address the problem of UXO post-conflict, but it is 
silent on use, targeting and reliability issues. See Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War 
to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate 
Effects, Nov. 28, 2003, 2399 U.N.T.S. 100. These gaps, in part, inspired the Oslo process 
to negotiate the Cluster Munitions Convention outside of the United Nations and among 
like-minded States. See infra note 99. Detractors have argued that disarmament issues 
should be addressed within the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly and the 
Conventional Weapons Convention. See infra note 147.  
99. See Cluster Munition Use in Syria, LANDMINE & CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR 
(Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/stay-informed/press-releases/2014/ 
cluster-munition-use-in-syria.aspx. 
100. See Thomas J. Herthel, On the Chopping Block: Cluster Munitions and the Law of War, 
51 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 229 (2001).  
101. Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dec. 3, 2008, 2688 U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter 
CCM]. 
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joined the treaty;102 as such, it ultimately only governs about 10 percent of 
the world’s stockpile.103 The treaty does not prohibit joint military action 
with nations that use cluster munitions, although States parties are to pro-
mote ratification of the treaty by non-party States and cannot “assist, en-
courage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State 
Party” under the treaty.104 The United States, which possesses a large clus-
ter munition stockpile,105 stands as a persistent objector to any per se pro-
hibition on the use of cluster munitions.106 A recent declaration at the First 
Review Conference on the CCM condemning “any use of cluster muni-
tions by any actor” garnered strong, but not universal, support.107 Perhaps 
the strongest argument for the view that cluster munitions are inherently 
unlawful in light of the principle of distinction stems from their high “dud 
rate,”108 a defect that manufacturers are addressing in more advanced mod-
                                                                                                                      
102. See Convention Status, THE CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS http:// 
www.cl usterconvention.org/the-convention/convention-status/ (last visited Apr. 16, 
2016).  
103. France and the Elimination of Cluster Munitions, FRANCE DIPLOMATIE, http://www. 
diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/disarmament-and-non-proliferation/france-
and-the-elimination-of-cluster-munitions/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2016).  
104. CCM, supra note 101, arts. 1(1)(c), 21(3)–(4). 
105. The United States is one of the biggest producers and exporters of cluster muni-
tions. It has stockpiled between 700 million and one billion sub-munitions. Cluster Muni-
tions at a Glance, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION (Nov. 2012), https://www.armscontrol. 
org/factsheets/clusterataglance.  
106. See OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW 
OF WAR MANUAL § 6.13 (2015) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL].  
107. Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 
Final Report, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. CCM/Conf./2015/7 (Oct. 13, 2015), https://documents- 
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/234/81/PDF/G1523481.pdf?OpenElement. 
See Nations Condemn Cluster Munition Attacks, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 11, 2015), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/11/nations-condemn-cluster-munition-attacks. The 
U.N. General Assembly recently issued its first resolution in support of the CCM, which 
was adopted 130 to 2 (with forty abstentions, including the United States). See Meetings 
Coverage, General Assembly, Speakers in First Committee Decry Destructive Force of 
Indiscriminate Weapons While Some Defend Need for National Protection, Approving 11 
More Drafts, U.N. Meetings Coverage GA/DIS/3540 (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.un.org 
/press/en/2015/gadis3540.doc.htm.  
108. In light of this propensity, some commentators have likened cluster munitions to 
landmines in an effort to extend the prohibition on the use of landmines to these weap-
ons. See Herthel, supra note 100, at 232–33. The Oslo Process and many of the provisions 
within the CCM drew inspiration from the anti-personnel mine ban convention. Stuart 
Casey-Maslen, Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
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els through self-destruct features.109 One hundred fifty-five States—CCM 
parties and non-parties alike—have denounced the use of cluster munitions 
in Syria.110 The CIL study at Rule 71 indicates there is insufficient consen-
sus to support their total prohibition, instead listing them as among the 
weapons that many States consider to be indiscriminate in certain or all 
contexts. Despite evidence of regime use of these munitions, Syria issued 
written assurances in November 2015 that it is not using, and will not use, 
“indiscriminate weapons.”111   
Even absent a universal treaty or CIL ban, the deliberate, indiscriminate 
or disproportionate use of cluster bombs against civilians, or without ap-
propriate precautions,112 implicates many generalized prohibitions under 
IHL. For example, prior to conclusion of the CCM negotiations, the ICTY 
in Martić held that the defendant’s use of cluster munitions in a “densely 
populated” area of Zagreb was presumptively unlawful under general IHL 
principles, notwithstanding that there were military targets in the general 
vicinity of the attacks.113 The attack was also deemed a crime against hu-
manity.114 There may be certain scenarios, however, in which the use of 
cluster munitions against purely military objectives far from any civilian 
population remains lawful. The Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission, for 
instance, found that Eritrea had taken insufficient precautions within the 
requirements of Article 57 of API115 before and after using cluster muni-
                                                                                                                      
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW (2010), http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/cpusptam/cpusptam_e.pdf;  
109. FEICKERT & KERR, supra note 97, at 2.  
110. See G.A. Res. 67/L.63 (May 15, 2013 G.A. Res. 67/262, The Situation in Syria, 
(June 4, 2013); G.A. Res. 68/182, Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, 
(Jan. 30, 2014) (condemning cluster munition use in Syria). See generally Cluster Munitions Use 
in Syria, CLUSTER MUNITION COALITION, http://www.stopclustermunitions.org/en-gb 
/cluster-bombs/use-of-cluster-bombs/cluster-munition-use-in-syria.aspx (last visited Apr. 
16, 2016) (compiling condemnations).  
111. Secretary-General Report, supra note 86, ¶ 3. 
112. See ICRC CIL Study, supra note 17, r. 15 (Precautions in Attack), r. 22 (Principle 
of Precautions against the Effects of Attacks). 
113. Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, ¶ 461 (Int’l. Crim. Trib. 
for the former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007).  
114. Id. ¶ 469. 
115. Article 57 of API obliges parties to a conflict to “take all reasonable precautions 
to avoid losses of civilian lives and damage to civilian objects” in accordance with their 
rights and duties under IHL. API, in turn, drew inspiration from Article 19 of the Lieber 
Code, which governed the conduct of Union forces during the U.S. Civil War. With simi-
lar caveats on practicability, the Code required military commanders to “inform the enemy 
of their intention to bombard a place, so that the noncombatants, and especially the wom-
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tions in its conflict with Ethiopia.116 The ostensible target was an airport 
used for military purposes, but the pilots dropping the munitions accidently 
hit a nearby school and the surrounding neighborhood.117 The arbitral 
opinion, which was focused on State rather than individual criminal re-
sponsibility, and which required a clear and convincing evidentiary stand-
ard, did not condemn the use of these munitions and actually validated Eri-
trea’s argument that it was not “feasible” for it to rely on better-trained 
personnel during the operation.118 Absent a per se prohibition, the use of 
cluster munitions in Syria would have to be prosecuted under more general 
rules governing direct, indiscriminate, or disproportionate attacks. 
 
3. Incendiary Weapons 
 
The COI and human rights groups have also recorded the use of air-
dropped incendiary weapons,119 including so-called vacuum bombs or fuel-
air explosives (FAE).120 Incendiary weapons are munitions that produce fire 
through a chemical reaction involving flammable substances that burn at 
very high temperatures. They cause harm through thermal and respiratory 
                                                                                                                      
en and children, may be removed before the bombardment commences.” U.S. Depart-
ment of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field 
art. 19, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863 [hereinafter Lieber Code]. There is no ana-
log on precautions in APII, but the ICRC considers the rule on precautions to be inherent 
to the principle of distinction, which applies regardless of conflict classification. See ICRC 
CIL Study, supra note 17, r. 24. So does the U.N. General Assembly. See G.A. Res. 2675, 
Basic Principles for the Protection of Civilian Populations in Armed Conflicts (Dec. 9, 
1970). 
116. Partial Award: Central Front—Ethiopia’s Claim 2 (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 155, 
¶ 110 (Eri.–Eth. Claims Comm’n 2004), http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/754.  
117. Id. ¶¶ 109–10.  
118. Id. ¶¶ 109–12. For criticism, see ALEXANDER BREITEGGER, CLUSTER MUNI-
TIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: DISARMAMENT WITH A HUMAN FACE? § 4.1 (2012).  
119. Syria’s Use of Incendiary Weapons: Memorandum to Convention on Conventional Weapons 
Delegates, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 2013), http://www.refworld.org/docid/52820f6 
86.html.  
120. Note that vacuum bombs may not fully qualify as incendiary weapons as defined 
by Protocol III to the CCW because they have combined effects munition qualities. Pro-
tocol III excludes from its scope “[m]unitions designed to combine penetration, blast or 
fragmentation effects with an additional incendiary effects . . . [when] the incendiary effect 
is not specifically designed to cause burn injury to persons, but to be used against military 
objectives, such as armoured vehicles.” Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Incendiary Weapons art. 1(b)(ii), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter 
CCW Protocol III]. See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note106, § 6.14.1.4. 
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burns as well as secondary fires. FAE are thermobaric weapons that dis-
perse an aerosolized explosive cloud—often toxic in and of itself—that is 
ignited by a charge, producing an enormous shockwave.121 When these 
weapons are deployed sequentially, the resulting blast waves reinforce each 
other. They are more powerful in terms of energy output, and thus more 
destructive, than conventional explosives. Like other weapons that can be 
dispersed in gas form, incendiary weapons were developed primarily to deal 
with concealed targets (e.g., combatants hiding in bunkers or other fortifi-
cations who would be protected from shrapnel, debris, and other fragmen-
tary media).122 They also rely on multiple kill mechanisms: those persons in 
the immediate vicinity are ignited or crushed by collapsing structures, 
whereas those who are more remote from the blast site die when their 
lungs or other internal organs rupture. Given their dispersed effects, it is 
extremely difficult to discriminately use such weapons in an urban or popu-
lated area since it is virtually impossible to target their harmful effects or 
for civilians to take shelter.  
The use of such weapons in Syria has been universally condemned.123 
Although Protocol III124 of the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention 
(CCW) regulates the use of incendiary weapons, Syria is not a party and, in 
any case, the treaty contains some unfortunate definitional loopholes that 
make for piecemeal application. For one, it defines incendiary weapons by 
virtue of their primary purpose (to cause burn injuries) rather than their 
impact or incidental effects.125 It bans the use of all incendiary weapons 
                                                                                                                      
121. Thermobaric Explosive, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/mi 
litary/systems/munitions/thermobaric.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2016); Backgrounder on 
Russian Fuel Air Explosives (“Vacuum Bombs”), HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 1, 2000), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2000/02/01/backgrounder-russian-fuel-air-explosives-vacu 
um-bombs.  
122. Marines Quiet about Brutal New Weapon, DEFENSETECH (Nov. 14, 2005), http:// 
www.defensetech.org/2005/11/14/marines-quiet-about-brutal-new-weapon/.  
123. See G.A. Res. A/RES/69/189, ¶ 2, The Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian 
Arab Republic (Dec. 18, 2014) (demanding “that the Syrian authorities immediately put an 
end to all indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas and public spaces, including those involv-
ing the use of terror tactics, airstrikes, barrel and vacuum bombs, chemical weapons and 
heavy artillery”); Human Rights Council Res. 28/20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/28/20 
(Mar. 27, 2015). 
124. CCW Protocol III, supra note 120. 
125. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, FROM 
CONDEMNATION TO CONCRETE ACTION: A FIVE-YEAR REVIEW OF INCENDIARY 
WEAPONS 6 (Nov. 2015), http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/In 
cendiaries-5-year-review-final.pdf [hereinafter HRW & IHRC].  
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against civilians and air-delivered incendiary weapons in areas with “con-
centrations of civilians,” even if a military objective is co-located therein.126 
However, it tolerates the use of land-delivered incendiary munitions against 
military objectives within concentrations of civilians so long as such objec-
tives are clearly separated and other precautions are taken.127 This distinc-
tion—largely artificial—between air-dropped and land-launched delivery 
systems reflects the Vietnam-era origins of the prohibition and the fervent 
condemnation of napalm use in that conflict.128  
The CIL study contains only a qualified ban on such weapons in all 
conflicts: “If incendiary weapons are used, particular care must be taken to 
avoid, and in any event to minimise, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians and damage to civilian objects.”129 Under this rule, such weapons 
may be used against an opponent as a last resort: “The anti-personnel use 
of incendiary weapons is prohibited, unless it is not feasible to use a less 
harmful weapon to render a person hors de combat.”130 In its listing of serious 
violations of IHL constituting war crimes, Rule 156 is silent as to the use of 
incendiary weapons. The absence of a complete ban stems in part from the 
fact that incendiary weapons are one of the few weapons that are effective 
against caches of biological weapons and biotoxins.131 In any case, while 
their direct use against civilians, as seen in Syria, is conclusively banned by 
CIL, a court would have to determine whether their use there would con-
stitute a war crime, either per se or as an indiscriminate attack. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
126. CCW Protocol III, supra note 120, art. 2(2) (“It is prohibited in all circumstances 
to make any military objective located within a concentration of civilians the object of 
attack by air-delivered incendiary weapons.”).  
127. Id., art. 2(3).  
128. HRW & IHRC, supra note 125, at 8. See generally ROBERT M. NEER, NAPALM, AN 
AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY (2013) (tracing history of use and prohibition of napalm). 
129. ICRC CIL Study, supra note 17, r. 85. 
130. Id.  
131. Although the United States has ratified Protocol III, many State parties rejected a 
U.S. reservation seeking to uphold the right to use such weapons against military objec-
tives located in concentration of civilians “where it is judged that such use would cause 
fewer casualties and/or less collateral damage than alternative weapons.” See Jeff Abram-
son, U.S. Incendiary-Weapons Policy Rebuffed, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION (Mar. 31, 2010), 
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_04/Incendiary. 
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4. Poison and Poisoned Weapons 
 
As originally enacted, Article 8 of the ICC Statute specifically penalized the 
use of certain forms of poison and poisonous weapons in IACs (although 
an earlier draft of this provision did not distinguish between IACs and NI-
ACs).132 It is thus criminal to employ poison or poisoned weapons (Article 
8(2)(b)(xvii)) and asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous 
liquids, materials and devices (Article 8(2)(b)(xviii)) in an IAC.133 The use of 
these weapons is also prohibited by various historical instruments, such as 
the 1925 Gas Protocol.134 Rule 72 of the CIL study prohibits the use of 
poison or poisoned weapons in all circumstances, and Rule 70 includes 
poison in the list of weapons considered indiscriminate in certain or all 
contexts, but they are not listed specifically as crimes in Rule 156.  
During the Kampala Review Conference in 2010, which also resulted in 
the codification of the crime of aggression, States parties adopted by con-
sensus an amendment proposed by Belgium to extend the prohibitions on 
poison, poisoned weapons, and asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases to 
NIACs.135 The new provisions appear as sub-paragraphs (xii) and (xiv) in 
Article 8(2)(e) governing NIACs. Other Belgian proposals—which would 
have penalized the use of biological and chemical weapons, anti-personnel 
mines, non-detectable fragments, and blinding laser weapons—did not 
garner sufficient support.136 A 2009 proposal by Mexico to make the use of 
                                                                                                                      
132. See Roger S. Clark, Building on Article 8(2)(b)(xx) of the Rome Statute of the Internation-
al Criminal Court: Weapons and Methods of Warfare, 12 NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 366 
(2009). 
133. A third provision (Article 8(2)(b)(xix)) penalizes the use of bullets that expand or 
flatten easily in the human body (so-called dum-dum bullets), reflecting the 1899 Hague 
Declaration on Prohibited Bullets. See Declaration (IV, 3) Concerning Expanding Bullets, 
July 29, 1899, 187 Consol. T.S. 459, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 1002. 
134. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or 
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 
L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter Gas Protocol]. The Gas Protocol was a response to the failure of 
prior instruments to prevent the use of chemical weapons in World War I. The Protocol 
only bans the international use of such weapons, not their production or stockpiling. Syria 
has been a party since 1968.  
135. See Prohibited Weapons and the Belgian Amendment: Symbolic, But of What?, THE ICC 
REVIEW CONFERENCE: KAMPALA 2010 BLOG (May 22, 2010), http://iccreview confer-
ence.blogspot.de/2010/05/prohibited-weapons-and-belgian.html. The Belgian proposal 
also extended the crime of using dum-dum bullets to NIACs.  
136. International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, 8th Sess., Official Records, ICC-ASP/8/20, Annex II 
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nuclear weapons an international crime met the same fate.137 All these pro-
posals remain in play within the Assembly of States Parties, however, and 
may be taken up if a subsequent review conference is calendared.138  
These changes to Article 8(2)(e) were billed as a logical extension of a 
set of prohibitions that already existed in IACs.139 That said, this seemingly 
innocuous harmonization of the law met some resistance in light of the 
fact that certain chemical agents (and flattening bullets)140—which might 
meet the technical definition of prohibited weapons under IHL—remain 
lawful when used in certain law enforcement situations (such as for riot 
control and in hostage-rescue operations) as a less lethal alternative to 
deadly force.141 There was concern that the disparate legal treatment of this 
technology in IHL as compared to the law governing non-IHL scenarios 
may give rise to unfairness or confusion in so-called “three-block wars.”142 
This concept reflects the fact that in contemporary armed conflicts a State’s 
armed forces may be involved in full-scale combat on one block, a stabili-
zation operation on the next block and a humanitarian re-
lief/reconstruction operation on a third block. States also argued that the 
penal prohibition in the ICC Statute should not apply to substances with 
only temporary effects. This “safe haven” is reflected in the ICC’s Ele-
ments of Crimes, which contain a harm threshold requiring a showing that 
                                                                                                                      
(“Report of the Working Group on the Review Conference”), App. I (“Belgium”), 
Amend. 2, at 59–60 (Nov. 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP8/OR 
/OR-ASP8-Vol.I-ENG.Annexes.pdf.  
137. Id. at 64.  
138. Informal Compilation of Proposals to Amend the Rome Statute, SECRETARIAT OF THE 
ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES (Jan. 23, 2015), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs 
/Publications/WGA-Inf-Comp-RS-amendments-ENG.pdf.  
139. See Amal Alamuddin & Philippa Webb, Expanding Jurisdiction over War Crimes under 
Article 8 of the ICC Statute, 8 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1219 (2010) 
(tracing drafting history).  
140. See Practice Relating to Rule 77: Expanding Bullets, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/cus 
tomary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule77. 
141. Kenneth Watkins, Chemical Agents and “Expanding” Bullets: Limited Law Enforcement 
Exceptions or Unwarranted Handcuffs?, in THE LAW OF WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY: WEA-
PONRY AND THE USE OF FORCE 193 (Anthony M. Helm ed., 2006) (Vol. 82, U.S. Naval 
War College International Law Studies); Robin Coupland & Dominique Loye, The 1899 
Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets: A Treaty Effective for More than 100 Years Faces 
Complex Contemporary Issues, 85 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 135 (2003), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_849_coupland_et_loye.pdf.  
142. A. Walter Dorn & Michael Varey, The Rise and Demise of the “Three Block War,” 10 
CANADIAN MILITARY JOURNAL 38 (2009), http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol10/no1/d 
oc/07-dornvarey-eng.pdf.  
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the poison or prohibited gas substance “causes death or serious damage to 
health in the ordinary course of events, through its asphyxiating or toxic 
properties.”143 These amendments to Article 8 are now in force, having 
garnered the necessary thirty ratifications.144 
 
5. Chemical Weapons  
 
This brings us to the proven use by the Assad regime (and likely ISIL) of 
chemical weapons and agents—including sarin, sulfur mustard, and chlo-
rine145—starting with the sarin nerve agent attack in Ghouta in August 
2013.146 There are a number of international instruments prohibiting the 
use of chemical weapons, including the 1899 Hague Declaration on the 
                                                                                                                      
143. See, e.g., International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes art. 8(2)(b)(xvii), U.N. 
Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 9, 2002), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-
A6AD-40EC-AD7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf [hereinafter ICC 
Elements of Crimes] (War crime of employing poison or poisoned weapons). When it 
comes to flattening bullets, the ICC’s Elements of Crimes introduce a mens rea element, 
requiring proof that “[t]he perpetrator was aware that the nature of the bullets was such 
that their employment would uselessly aggravate suffering or the wounding effect.” Id., art. 
8(2)(b)(xx) (War crime of employing prohibited bullets). 
144. Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ 
ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=21F94893DF9ADA56C1257E2
F0038D6C5 (last visited Apr. 18, 2016). Attesting to lingering concerns with the scope of 
the amendments, the Czech Republic ratified the amendment with a reservation that “[t]he 
prohibition . . . does not apply to the use of such bullets during activities of police nature 
in the context of law enforcement and maintenance of public order, which do not consti-
tute direct participation an armed conflict, such as rescuing hostages and neutralizing civil 
aircraft hijackers.” Id. 
145. Chemical weapon use over the course of the conflict has been confirmed by the 
U.N. Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian 
Arab Republic; the OPCW, which launched its own fact finding mission in Syria; the 
World Health Organization; and the COI, plus investigative reporting and citizen journal-
ism. The U.N. Mission was not tasked in Resolution 2118 with allocating responsibility for 
chemical weapon use. S.C. Res. 2118 (Sept. 27, 2013). As a result, the Security Council 
ordered a new joint investigative body—the U.N.-OPCW Joint Investigative Mechanism 
(JIM)—to review the evidence amassed to date and to assign responsibility for reported 
chemical weapon use. S.C. Res. 2235 (Aug. 7, 2015). It now seems that such weapons, 
with varying degrees of sophistication and impact, have been employed by the Assad re-
gime and various armed groups alike. The JIM submitted its first report on February 12. 
U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Feb 12, 2016 from the Secretary-General to the Pres-
ident of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2016/142 (Feb. 12, 2016). 
146. Syria Chemical Attack: What We Know, BBC (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.bbc.com 
/news/world-middle-east-23927399.  
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Use of Asphyxiating Gases,147 the 1907 Hague Regulations,148 the 1925 Gas 
Protocol, and the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Develop-
ment, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their 
Destruction (CWC).149 Syria ratified the latter treaty in 2013150 as part of the 
U.S.-Russian Joint Framework Agreement on Chemical Weapons151 blessed 
by Security Council Resolution 2118, which required Syria to dismantle its 
chemical weapons arsenal under international supervision.152 None of these 
treaties, except the CWC, envisions an international penal regime or applies 
in all circumstances, including in NIACs.153 The Hague Declaration and the 
Gas Protocol, for example, bind parties inter se, but do not necessarily apply 
when parties are engaged in internal armed conflicts or in IACs involving 
non-party States.154 All that said, the CIL study states that any chemical 
                                                                                                                      
147. Declaration (IV, 2) on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffu-
sion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases, July 29, 1899, 187 Consol. T.S. 453, 26 Mar-
tens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 998. 
148. The 1907 Hague Regulations forbid poison or poisoned weapons. Hague Regu-
lations, supra note 31, art. 23.  
149. CWC, supra note 74. The Convention, which entered into force in 1997, enjoys 
almost universal ratification. See also G.A. Res. 2603 (XXIV) (Dec. 16, 1969) (declaring any 
use of chemical or biological weapons in an IAC to be contrary to international law).  
150. The continued use of chemical weapons by Syria following its ratification of the 
CWC marks the first documented use of chemical weapons by a CWC State party, alt-
hough Syria continues to deny any chemical weapons use on its part. See U.N. SCOR, 70th 
Sess., 7501st mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. S/PV.7501 (Aug. 7, 2015) (“I [the Syrian Ambassador 
to the UN] reiterate once again that the Syrian Government and the Syrian army have 
never used chemical weapons, and never will.”). The use of chlorine in barrel bombs 
would also violate the CWC, as well as prior Security Council resolutions, such as Resolu-
tion 2118, supra note 145, barring the use of chemical weapons. See S.C. Res. 2209 (Mar. 6, 
2015). 
151. Letter dated Sept 19, 2013 from the Permanent Representatives of the Russian 
Federation and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Sec-
retary-General, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/68/398–S/2013/565 (Sept. 14, 2013). 
152. S.C. Res. 2118, supra note 145. The Resolution also declared “the use of chemical 
weapons anywhere constituted a threat to international peace and security” (¶ 1) and ex-
pressed the Council’s “strong conviction that those individuals responsible for the use of 
chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic should be held accountable” (¶ 15), alt-
hough no precise mechanism was proposed.  
153. The CWC obliges States parties to prohibit activities banned by the CWC and 
“[e]xtend its penal legislation . . . to any activity prohibited to a State Party under this 
Convention undertaken anywhere by national persons, possessing its nationality.” CWC, 
supra note 74, art. VII(1)(c)(c). See S.C. Res. 2209, supra note 150. 
154. Jillian Blake & Aqsa Mahmud, A Legal “Red Line”? Syria and the Use of Chemical 
Weapons in Civil Conflict, 61 UCLA LAW REVIEW DISCOURSE 244, 251 (2013), 
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weapon use is prohibited in NIACs and IACs,155 a conclusion that is not 
uniformly shared.156 Nevertheless, in its resolutions addressing chemical 
weapon use in Syria, the Security Council consistently calls for accountabil-
ity, implying that the use of chemical weapons in a NIAC is a war crime.157 
Considering only the text of the ICC Statute, one would assume the 
genus crimes of employing asphyxiating and poisonous weapons would 
encompass the use of chemical and biological weapons.158 The treaty’s 
drafting history, however, reveals that a provision specifically penalizing the 
use of chemical weapons was deliberately rejected by delegates as part of a 
compromise around the inclusion of nuclear weapons.159 States from the 
developing world wanted a provision criminalizing resort to nuclear weap-
ons; States from the developed world wanted a similar provision on chemi-
cal and biological weapons. This gulf between the poor man’s and the rich 
man’s weapons of mass destruction has long bedeviled disarmament ef-
forts.160 The stalemate was resolved by excluding explicit reference to both 
categories of weapons and adding a placeholder that might one day allow 
for their piecemeal inclusion. The ICC Statute at Article 8(2)(b)(xx) govern-
ing IACs thus would allow for the prosecution of individuals shown to 
have employed “weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare 
which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering 
or which are inherently indiscriminate in violation of the international law 
                                                                                                                      
http://www.uclalawreview.org/a-legal-%E2%80%9Cred-line%E2%80%9D-syria-and-
the-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-civil-conflict/. The Gas Protocol, supra note 134, states, 
“the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting 
such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacterio-
logical methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves according to the 
terms of this declaration.” 
155. ICRC CIL Study, supra note 17, r. 74 (“The use of chemical weapons is prohibit-
ed.”); id. r. 156 (“Recent treaties prohibiting the use of certain weapons in any type of con-
flict require that such use be subject to criminal sanctions.”).  
156. See Blake & Mahmud, supra note 154, at 255 (“There is no strict customary prac-
tice regarding the use of chemical weapons in civil conflicts.”).  
157. See S.C. Res. 2209, supra note 150.  
158. See Ralf Trapp, The Investigation into the Islamic State and Chemical Weapons, JUST SE-
CURITY (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.justsecurity.org/27116/investigation-islamic-state-
chemical-weapons/. 
159. See Dapo Akande, Can the ICC Prosecute for Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria?, EJIL 
TALK! (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/can-the-icc-prosecute-for-use-of-
chemical-weapons-in-syria/.  
160. See Nicholas A. Sims, The Biological Weapons Convention and Prevention of Bioterrorism, 
in TERRORISM AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: RESPONDING TO THE CHAL-
LENGE 158, 175 (Ian Bellany ed., 2007). 
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of armed conflict.” However, this provision will not be activated until 
“such weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare are the 
subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are included in an annex to this 
Statute, by an amendment in accordance with the relevant provisions set 
forth in articles 121 and 123.” Although Belgium attempted to generate just 
such a list of prohibited munitions in time for the Kampala Review Con-
ference, there was insufficient support at the time and the provision re-
mains a dead letter.  
If confronted with charges involving the use of chemical weapons, the 
ICC will be obliged to interpret the text of its constitutive document, now 
amended, in light of this legislative history to determine which charges to 
allow.161 In the absence of a specific weapon prohibition, the improper use 
of such inherently imprecise weapons would ordinarily be charged as an 
indiscriminate attack or as launching an attack with the purpose of inflict-
ing terror among the civilian population. However, the use of such weap-
ons within urban or densely-populated areas could also be charged as an 
intentional attack on civilians, even if some of the attacks managed to strike 
legitimate military objectives. If the harm to civilians is sufficiently acute, an 
indiscriminate attack could thus be regarded as the equivalent of a direct 
attack,162 and even a crime against humanity, which would be prosecutable 
before the ICC. Absent an express weapons ban, the use of chemical 
weapons exclusively against armed actors may not be prosecutable before 
the ICC.  
 
C. Siege Warfare 
 
Turning to war crimes involving the methods of warfare, brutal sieges have 
been another feature of the war in Syria. The city of Madaya, for example, 
has been under siege for months at the time of this writing, its inhabitants 
reduced to eating grass. To be fair, there are also government-controlled 
towns, notably Fuaa and Kefraya in Idlib province, that are besieged by the 
opposition. Indeed, between 400,000 (the United Nations’ figure)163 and 
                                                                                                                      
161. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 (listing the drafting history as a supplementary tool of interpretation to resolve ambi-
guity in text).  
162. Fenrick, supra note 63, at 561, 565. 
163. Yacoub El Hillo & Kevin Kennedy, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Hu-
manitarian Affairs, Joint Statement on Hard-to-Reach and Besieged Communities in Syria, RE-
LIEFWEB (Jan. 7, 2016), http://m.reliefweb.int/report/1334131.  
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600,000 people (the Syrian American Medical Society’s estimate)164 are 
“under siege” or in “hard-to-reach” areas in Syria.165 The Syrian govern-
ment has arbitrarily and discriminatorily barred or limited the delivery of 
humanitarian aid to these populations, including by the ICRC.166 A compli-
cated agreement reached earlier this year is supposed to allow coordinated 
aid into both rebel- and State-controlled regions in need, but distribution 
difficulties persist. There are also allegations, based upon a leaked internal 
memorandum, that the United Nations could have acted sooner and more 
forcefully to supply humanitarian aid, but was wary of alienating the Assad 
regime and derailing the planned negotiations.167 These barriers to the pro-
vision of food and other forms of aid exist notwithstanding the Security 
Council’s forceful resolutions in 2014–15 calling on all parties to lift sieges 
on populated areas,168 condemning the Syrian government’s withholding of 
access to humanitarian actors, authorizing the delivery of aid without ex-
press permission through certain identified border crossings, calling upon 
all parties to implement ceasefires and humanitarian pauses to enable the 
provision of humanitarian assistance,169 and decrying the “use of starvation 
of civilians as a method of combat.”170 
Siege warfare is a tactic developed during the Middle Ages that involves 
surrounding a garrison or a populated area with the goal of defeating the 
enemy force by deteriorating their defenses, cutting them off from rein-
forcements and vital supplies, and preventing their escape. Although sieges 
are costly and time consuming, they are perhaps sometimes easier than en-
gaging the enemy directly in open battle or going house-to-house to root 
out the adversary in a densely populated area. The legality of siege warfare 
                                                                                                                      
164. SLOW DEATH: LIFE AND DEATH IN SYRIAN COMMUNITIES UNDER SIEGE, SYRI-
AN AMERICAN MEDICAL SOCIETY (2015), https://www.sams-usa.net/foundation/imag 
es/PDFs/Slow%20Death_Syria%20Under%20Siege.pdf.  
165. The latter term is a euphemism that some argue is employed to avoid using the 
“S” word (siege), given its potential war crimes implications. Roy Gutman, The U.N. Knew 
for Months That Madaya Was Starving, FOREIGN POLICY (Jan. 15, 2016), http://foreignpoli 
cy.com/2016/01/15/u-n-knew-for-months-madaya-was-starving-syria-assad/.  
166. Marianne Gasser, Syria Conflict: Siege Warfare and Suffering in Madaya, BBC (Feb. 1, 
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35455705. 
167. Open Letter from Besieged Syrians to UN’s Stephen O’Brien, WORLDPOST (Jan. 15, 2016), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-syria-campaign/open-letter-from-besieged_b_89798 
00.html.  
168. S.C. Res. 2139, supra note 84.  
169. S.C. Res. 2165, supra note 85.  
170. S.C. Res. 2258, pmbl., para. 4, (Dec. 22, 2015). See also Human Rights Council 
Res. 26/23, supra note 52, ¶ 7 (further condemning “the besiegement of civilians”). 
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received considerable attention following the siege of Sarajevo (April 1992–
February 1996) during the war occasioned by the dissolution of the former 
Yugoslavia. Major General Stanislav Galić, who commanded the Bosnian 
Serb unit that encircled the city, was indicted for his role in a shelling and 
sniping campaign in the city, the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The stag-
ing of the siege itself was not included among the charges for which he was 
on trial.171 Rather, the ICTY convicted Galić of, among other offenses, de-
liberately attacking and terrorizing civilians. These treaty prohibitions were 
implicitly incorporated into the ICTY Statute, which at Article 3 criminaliz-
es “violations of the laws and customs of war.”172 Given that the crime of 
inflicting terror was not expressly enumerated in the Statute or in any trea-
ty, Galić challenged the charge on nullum crimen sine lege grounds. The Ap-
peals Chamber ruled that the crime of inflicting terror on the civilian popu-
lation was a part of CIL at the time the defendant acted and so fell within 
its jurisdiction.173 He was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment,174 a 
sentence that was actually increased on appeal.175 
This precedent reveals that siege warfare per se is not necessarily un-
lawful.176 Geneva Convention IV, which does not regulate the means and 
methods of warfare in any detail, seems to assume the legality of siege tac-
tics by articulating rules aimed at protecting certain civilians located within 
besieged or encircled areas.177 That said, the evolution in the location in 
                                                                                                                      
171. Galić Trial Judgment, supra note 56, ¶ 609 (“There is no dispute between the par-
ties that General Galić, as the Corps commander, was in charge of continuing the plan-
ning and execution of the military encirclement of Sarajevo. . . . In itself, that encirclement 
is not directly relevant to the charges in the Indictment.”). 
172. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, S.C. 
Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), adopting The Secretary-General Report 
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808. 
173. Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 86 
(Int’l. Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Galić Appeals 
Judgment]. 
174. Galić Trial Judgment, supra note 56, ¶ 769. 
175. Galić Appeals Judgment, supra note 173, ¶¶ 455–56.  
176. Riordan, supra note 54, at 156; Tom Gjelten, Siege, CRIMES OF WAR, 
http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/siege/. But see Fenrick, supra note 63, at 557 (sug-
gesting that “the lex specialis of siege warfare has been effectively abolished” in light of 
contemporary developments in the law around the protection of civilians).  
177. Geneva Convention IV encourages the parties to conclude agreements for the 
removal of the wounded and sick, children, etc. (but not all civilians) and allow for the free 
passage of medical personnel and religious clerics. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 14, 
art. 17. 
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which armed conflicts are now often fought—in urban areas rather than in 
battlegrounds remote from the civilian population—coupled with devel-
opments in IHL, make “it very difficult for a commander to conduct a 
siege that is both successful and lawful.”178 Siege warfare thus remains law-
ful under contemporary law in the narrowest of circumstances: so long as it 
is directed only at combatants and those directly participating in hostilities, 
civilians are allowed to leave an encircled area, and there is adherence to 
other provisions of IHL—a major challenge when combatants and civilians 
are co-located and dependent on the same necessities. These modern re-
strictions have not been universally welcomed, since they go far toward 
defeating the purpose of a siege: to compel the target force to surrender.179 
In any case, the various sieges in place around Syria do not adhere to any of 
these strictures, so those responsible are in breach of IHL.  
 
D. Starvation of Civilians  
 
The deliberate starvation of civilians is not a new tactic of war; parallels to 
the situations in Leningrad, Biafra, and Sri Lanka come immediately to 
mind.180 IHL makes clear that the deliberate starvation of the civilian popu-
lation as a tactic of war is prohibited and a prosecutable war crime.181 This 
prohibition finds clear expression in Article 54 of API, which states that 
besieging forces may not starve civilians “as a method of warfare.” Similar-
ly, it is prohibited to “attack, destroy, remove or render useless” any items 
necessary for civilians’ survival (e.g., food, land used to cultivate food, wa-
ter, irrigation works, etc.), regardless of whether the objective is to starve 
the civilian population, to cause them to flee, or is premised on some other 
motive.182 
                                                                                                                      
178. Riordan, supra note 54, at 150. 
179. See Yoram Dinstein, Siege Warfare and the Starvation of Civilians, in HUMANITARIAN 
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD 145, 151 (A.M. Delissen et al. eds., 
1991) (“The broad injunction against sieges affecting civilians is untenable in practice, 
since no other method of warfare has been devised to bring about the capture of a de-
fended town.”). 
180. See generally Charles A. Allen, Civilian Starvation and Relief during Armed Conflict: The 
Modern Humanitarian Law, 19 GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE 
LAW 1 (1989) (discussing history of sieges and prohibits on measures directed at civilians). 
181. See Dinstein, supra note 179.  
182. The full text of Article 54(2) is as follows: 
 
It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production 
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This latter prohibition does not apply to resources used exclusively by 
an adverse party to sustain its own armed forces or in direct support of 
military action. Such resources may be directly targeted because they con-
stitute military objectives.183 Moreover, in instances of imperative military 
necessity to counter an invader, a State party may derogate from the above 
prohibition and resort to “scorched earth” tactics to defend its own territo-
ry.184 These rules govern IACs, but a similar set of prohibitions appears in 
Article 14 of APII. Additionally, the ICRC considers the prohibition on 
deliberate starvation of civilians to be part of CIL, regardless of conflict 
classification.185 Nonetheless, deliberately starving civilians as a method of 
warfare may be prosecuted before the ICC under Article 8(b)(2)(xxv), but 
only when committed in an IAC. 
The fact that the deliberate starvation of the civilian population as a 
method of war is now unequivocally condemned—and even made crimi-
nal—marks an important evolution in the law. The Lieber Code, which 
governed Union forces during the U.S. Civil War, stated: 
 
War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to starve the hostile bel-
ligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjugation of 
the enemy. . . . When a commander of a besieged place expels the non-
combatants, in order to lessen the number of those who consume his 
stock of provisions, it is lawful, though an extreme measures, to drive 
them back, so as to hasten on the surrender.186 
                                                                                                                      
of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation 
works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian 
population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out 
civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive. 
 
See Partial Award: Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims, Eritrea’s 
Claims 25–26 (Eri. v. Eth.), 26 R.I.A.A. 291, ¶¶ 100–5 (Eri.–Eth. Claims Comm’n 2005) 
(finding Ethiopia had breached customary IHL, and specifically the CIL rule contained in 
Article 54 of API, by targeting a water reservoir that was used by civilians).  
183. Article 52(2) of API indicates that for objects to be military objectives, they must 
“by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military ac-
tion” and their “total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances 
ruling at the time, [must] offer[] a definite military advantage.” 
184. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 106, § 5.20.4. See also Trial of Wilhelm 
List and Others, 8 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 34, 68–69 (1948) (finding 
“scorched earth” tactics against pursuing troops to be compelled by military necessity and 
thus lawful given that civilians were evacuated in advance); Dinstein, supra note 179, at 150 
(noting that API allows for scorched earth tactics only in territory under a party’s control). 
185. ICRC CIL Study, supra note 17, r. 53.  
186. Lieber Code, supra note 115, arts. 17–18. 
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As recently as World War II, it was still understood that a belligerent could 
lay siege to a place and drive fleeing civilians back to areas controlled by 
the enemy in order to put pressure on available food and other resources. 
Indeed, in the so-called High Command Case, a U.S. military commission 
convened pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10 acquitted Field Mar-
shall Wilhelm von Leeb for his role in the brutal siege of Leningrad (Sep-
tember 1941–January 1944) on this rationale. The opinion states: 
 
A belligerent commander may lawfully lay siege to a place controlled by 
the enemy and endeavor by a process of isolation to cause its surrender. 
The propriety of attempting to reduce it by starvation is not questioned. 
Hence the cutting off every source of sustenance from without is deemed 
legitimate.187 
 
The judges concluded, “We might wish the law were otherwise, but we 
must administer it as we find it.”188  
Other U.S. articulations of the law also mirror this evolution. The 1956 
law of war Army field manual noted that there was no rule of law that re-
quired that civilians be allowed to leave a besieged locality and that it was 
within a commander’s discretion to drive them back in order to hasten the 
adversary’s surrender.189 By contrast, the new Department of Defense 
(DoD) Law of War Manual affirms that the starvation of civilians as a meth-
od of conflict is prohibited, regardless of conflict classification.190 The Man-
ual does accept the legality of starving enemy forces—whether by way of 
siege warfare, embargo, blockade, or the destruction of enemy food 
                                                                                                                      
187. The German High Command Trial, 12 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 1, 84 
(1949), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-12.pdf.  
188. Id.  
189. See Department of the Army, FM 27-10: The Law of Land Warfare ¶ 44 (1956), 
http://www.aschq.army.mil/gc/files/fm27-10.pdf (“Subject to the foregoing exceptions, 
there is no rule of law which compels the commander of an investing force to permit 
noncombatants to leave a besieged locality. It is within the discretion of the besieging 
commander whether he will permit noncombatants to leave and under what conditions. 
Thus, if a commander of a besieged place expels the noncombatants in order to lessen the 
logistical burden he has to bear, it is lawful, though an extreme measure, to drive them 
back, so as to hasten the surrender. Persons who attempt to leave or enter a besieged place 
without obtaining the necessary permission are liable to be fired upon, sent back, or de-
tained.”).  
190. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 106, § 5.20. 
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sources—so long as adherence to the principles of distinction and propor-
tionality is observed.191  
Although this prohibition is now well established, there have been very 
few prosecutions for the crime of deliberately starving the enemy civilian 
population. A notable exception is an in absentia national prosecution in 
Croatia against Momčilo Perišić (a colonel in the Yugoslav National Army 
who was also prosecuted by the ICTY for other crimes192) and eighteen 
others.193 The court convicted a number of defendants for crimes commit-
ted during the siege of the city of Zadar under the Croatian Criminal Code, 
which lists starvation of civilians as a punishable war crime.194 
 
E. Barring Humanitarian Access to Civilians 
 
The Syrian regime has been accused of engaging in overt and constructive 
obstruction (e.g., through burdensome administrative procedures) of hu-
manitarian aid to civilian populations on discriminatory grounds.195 Invok-
ing Chapter VII, the Security Council has established humanitarian corri-
dors across conflict lines at certain border crossings. It also deployed a 
U.N. monitoring mechanism to confirm the humanitarian nature of ship-
ments into government-, rebel-, and even ISIL-controlled areas, and to 
provide advance notice to the government of Syria of shipments.196 All Syr-
ian parties to the conflict were ordered to enable the unhindered delivery 
                                                                                                                      
191. Id. § 5.20.1–5.20.2.  
192. Prosecutor v. Perišić, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (Int’l. 
Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Feb. 28, 2013). 
193. Public Prosecutor v. M.P. et al., Case No. K. 74/96, District Court in Zadar, 
Croatia (Hrvatska) (Apr. 24, 1997), http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/ 
1053.  
194. Criminal Code, Chap. 13, Article 158 (Narodne novine No. 110 of Oct. 21, 
1997), http://www.vsrh.hr/CustomPages/Static/HRV/Files/Legislation__Criminal-Code 
.pdf - page=44 (unofficial translation).  
195. Secretary-General Report, supra note 86, at 8. See also Human Rights Council Res. 
25/23, U.N. Doc. No. A/HRC/RES/25/23, ¶ 17 (Apr. 9, 2014) (condemning the denial 
of humanitarian assistance to civilians “from whatever quarter, noting especially the re-
sponsibilities of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic”). 
196. See S.C. Res. 2165, supra note 85; S.C. Res. 2191 (Dec. 17, 2014) (authorizing 
U.N. humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners to use certain routes across 
conflict lines and border crossings and establishing a monitoring mechanism under the 
authority of the U.N. Secretary-General).  
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of aid and ensure the safety and security of humanitarian actors.197 In sub-
sequent resolutions, the Council expressed grave concern at the lack of 
compliance, but did not call for criminal accountability for any breaches.198 
Impeding the provision of aid to civilians violates modern IHL, which 
in addition to prohibiting starvation as a weapon of war requires parties to 
allow humanitarian access to areas in need. Geneva Convention IV, aimed 
at the protection of noncombatants in IACs, mandates that States allow the 
free passage of medical consignments, food, and other relief supplies for 
the exclusive benefit of the civilian population,199 although this provision 
was designed primarily for blockades rather than sieges.200 Relief actions 
must be allowed into occupied territory or territory under the control of 
one side, subject to agreement between the parties on the technical ar-
rangements.201 The breach of these treaty rules, however, does not consti-
tute a grave breach giving rise to individual criminal responsibility. Moreo-
ver, these obligations may be suspended if the consignments are diverted 
for use by the opposing military force, the control over them may not be 
effective, or a definite advantage may accrue to the enemy.202 As the rap-
porteur of the Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team examining the 
siege of Sarajevo noted, “One is left with the unpalatable fact that . . . the 
only way to starve out a besieged military force, a legitimate act of war, is 
over the starved bodies of the civilian population.”203 
The ICC Statute goes farther than the IHL treaties. It allows for the 
prosecution of the intentional starvation of civilians as a method of warfare 
as such, but also “by depriving them of objects indispensable to their sur-
vival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the 
                                                                                                                      
197. Id. See also API, supra note 14, art. 71 (requiring the protection of relief person-
nel). 
198. S.C. Res. 2258, pmbl (Dec. 22, 2015). See also S.C. Res. 2268, ¶¶ 5–6 (Feb. 26, 
2016) (calling for the provision of aid following ceasefire).  
199. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 14, art. 23 (“Each High Contracting Party 
shall allow the free passage of all consignments of medical and hospital stores and objects 
necessary for religious worship intended only for civilians of another High Contracting 
Party, even if the latter is its adversary. It shall likewise permit the free passage of all con-
signments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children under fifteen, 
expectant mothers and maternity cases.”). 
200. Dinstein, supra note 179, at 148.  
201. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 14, art. 55. See also API, supra note 14, art. 70; 
Allen, supra note 180, at 72–73. 
202. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 14, art. 23. 
203. Riordan, supra note 54, at 171 (citing Canadian War Crimes Investigation Team 
“On-Site Report” (Aug. 1993)). 
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Geneva Conventions.”204 But again, this crime may be prosecuted only in 
IACs. Notwithstanding these treaty limitations, Rule 55 of the CIL study 
makes it clear that in all armed conflicts, the parties must facilitate impartial 
humanitarian relief for civilians in need.205 Rule 156 treats starvation and 
impeding relief supplies as war crimes in all conflicts. 
  
F. Targeting Energy Infrastructure 
 
Turning to the actions of the international coalition against ISIL, on No-
vember 16, 2015, U.S. aircraft destroyed 116 fuel trucks in oil-rich eastern 
Syria, the source of a solid portion of ISIL’s oil revenue. In a statement, the 
U.S. Department of Defense indicated that in addition to the tankers, air-
strikes also hit a number of tactical units, fighting positions, storage depots, 
vehicles and staging areas in Syria and Iraq as part of Operation Inherent 
Resolve.206 Although a DoD spokesman indicated that this was the coali-
tion’s first strike against tankers,207 the U.S. and Gulf coalitions and Russia 
have destroyed a number of ISIL’s oil-producing facilities and other energy 
assets in the past.208 In keeping with the IHL rule on precautions,209 the 
                                                                                                                      
204. ICC Statute, supra note 15, art. 8(2)(b)(xxv). 
205. ICRC CIL Study, supra note 17, r. 55 (“The parties to the conflict must allow 
and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, 
which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction, subject 
to their right of control.”).  
206. News Release, U.S. Department of Defense, Strikes Continue Against ISIL Tar-
gets in Syria, Iraq (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article 
/629013/strikes-continue-against-isil-targets-in-syria-iraq. In subsequent operations, the 
number of tankers destroyed reached 238. US Air Strike “Hits 238 IS Oil Trucks” in Syria, 
BBC (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34906011. Not to be 
outdone, the Russian press reported that Russia destroyed a thousand tankers. Russian 
Airstrikes Destroy 472 Terrorist Targets in Syria in 48 Hours, 1,000 Oil Tankers in 5 Days, RT 
(Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.rt.com/news/323065-syria-airstrikes-terrorists-russia/. The 
DoD expressed skepticism toward this assertion. Pentagon Skeptical of Claims Russia Hit 
1,000 ISIS Tankers, FOX NEWS (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/ 
11/23/us-steps-up-attacks-on-islamic-state-oil-trucks-in-syria.html. 
207. Press Briefing by the Spokesman, Operation Inherent Resolve (Nov. 18, 2015), 
http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/630393/dep 
artment-of-defense-press-briefing-by-col-warren-via-dvids-from-baghdad-iraq [hereinafter 
Press Briefing].  
208. US-Led Strikes Hit ISIS Oil Areas for Second Day, BREITBARD (Sept. 26, 2014), 
http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2014/09/26/us-led-strikes-hit-is-group-oil-
areas-for-2nd-day/. See Kenneth Watkin, Targeting “Islamic State” Oil Facilities, 90 INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW STUDIES 499 (2014).  
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Pentagon warned truck drivers in advance of the planned strike with leaf-
lets210 dropped over the site, as well as show-of-force overflights. The coali-
tion did not attack drivers fleeing from their trucks, and it appears that no 
drivers were killed.211 The most recent strikes were part of a stepped-up 
campaign to further degrade ISIL’s energy infrastructure that was dubbed 
Tidal Wave II after a World War II effort to destroy oil refineries in 
Ploieşti, Romania that supplied up to a third of Nazi Germany’s fuel 
needs.212 The new operation is also reminiscent of the so-called “Tanker 
War,” the at-sea portion of the 1980–88 war between Iran and Iraq.213 
                                                                                                                      
209. According to the ICRC, each party to the conflict must give effective advance 
warning of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not 
permit. See ICRC CIL Study, supra note 17, r. 20.  
210. The leaflet messaging was unambiguous: “Get out of your trucks now, and run 
away from them. Warning. Airstrikes are coming, oil trucks will be destroyed. Get away 
from your oil trucks immediately. Do not risk your life.” Press Briefing, supra note 207. 
Given IHL’s precautionary obligations, leafletting has been used in prior military opera-
tions to warn the civilian population of an impending attack on a nearby military objective. 
Some States use other techniques. Israel has several, including the use of phone calls and 
text messages, as well as the more controversial “roof knocks” (i.e., dropping a minimal-
impact munition on a building before destroying it to allow the civilian population time to 
vacate the premises). See Janina Dill, Israel’s Use of Law and Warnings in Gaza, OPINIO JURIS 
(July 30, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/07/30/guest-post-israels-use-law-warnings-
gaza/. During the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1998, there was some question 
as to whether NATO troops had adequately warned the civilian staff of a Serbian televi-
sion station that was later destroyed, although blame was also laid on the Yugoslav author-
ities for not evacuating the building when it became known that it was on NATO’s target 
list. See Final Report, supra note 94, ¶ 77.  
211. If drivers had been killed in the strikes, it would be necessary to consider the 
principle of proportionality—assuming the drivers were civilians—and to take into ac-
count the doctrine of direct participation in hostilities. Civilians who are present in the 
vicinity of military objectives (e.g., civilian workers in a munitions plant) may be immune 
from being intentionally targeted, but they are not necessarily protected against attacks 
directed at those objectives. See Yoram Dinstein, Distinction and Loss of Civilian Protection in 
International Armed Conflicts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS 183, 
191 (Michael D. Carsten ed., 2008) (Vol. 84, U.S. Naval War College International Law 
Studies). 
212. Incidentally, according to the U.S. Air Force Historical Support Division, pro-
duction resumed quickly in Ploieşti. It remains to be seen if ISIL’s oil production capabil-
ity will also recover or if there will be long-term incapacitation of ISIL’s war economy as is 
hoped. Operation Tidalwave, The Low-Level Bombing of the Ploesti Oil Refineries, 1 August 1943, 
AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SUPPORT DIVISION, (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.afhso.af. 
mil/topics/fact sheets/factsheet.asp?id=17993.  
213. See generally ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN & ABRAHAM R. WAGNER, 2 THE LES-
SONS OF MODERN WAR: THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1990); GEORGE K. WALKER, THE TANK-
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The Treasury Department has estimated that ISIL was earning between 
$1 million and $1.5 million a day from illegal oil sales generated by a 
sprawling production system that rivals many State-owned oil companies in 
terms of organization and scope.214 A recent Rand Corporation study ranks 
oil as third on the list of ISIL’s sources of revenue, behind funds extracted 
through the extortion/taxation of people within territories it controls and 
funds stolen from Iraqi banks; other sources of income include ransoms, 
selling antiquities, human trafficking, and wealthy donors.215 At its peak, 
ISIL controlled up to 80 percent of Syria’s oil production—so much that 
the Syrian government and other rebel groups must, at times, purchase fuel 
from them, which may explain why these tankers have not been targeted in 
the past by the regime.216 Drivers, mostly independent traders, generally 
transport the crude to formal and informal refineries.217 Some petrol is 
consumed internally; the rest is exported across the border into Turkey or 
Iraq. 
The airstrikes against ISIL tankers must be evaluated against the prin-
ciples of distinction, which hinges upon the definition of military objec-
tives, and proportionality.218 The treaty definition of military objective, as 
confirmed by Rule 8 of the CIL study, has two components: (1) the pro-
posed target must make an effective contribution—through its nature, lo-
cation, purpose, or use—to military action by the party under attack, and 
(2) its destruction must offer a definite (as opposed to speculative or inde-
terminate) military advantage to the attacker in the circumstances at the 
time.219 Article 57 of API requires that commanders “do everything feasible 
                                                                                                                      
ER WAR, 1980–88: LAW AND POLICY (2000) (Vol. 74, U.S. Naval War College Internation-
al Law Studies). 
214. US: ISIS Earns $1M Per Day in Black Market Oil Sales, BREITBART (Oct. 24, 2014), 
http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2014/10/24/us-is-earns-1m-per-day-in-
black-market-oil-sales/.  
215. See Sarah Almukhtar, ISIS Finances are Strong, NEW YORK TIMES (May 19, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/05/19/world/middleeast/isis-finances.html? 
_r=1. The coalition has also damaged ISIL’s financial reserves. See Daphné Richemond-
Barak, Is Money a Legitimate Target? JUST SECURITY (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.just secu-
rity.org/29255/money-legitimate-target/.  
216. Jackie Northam, Hitting ISIS Where It Hurts by Striking Oil Trucks, NPR (Nov. 19, 
2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/11/19/456600398/hitting-isis-where 
-it-hurts-by-striking-oil-trucks.  
217. Id. 
218. See supra note 66. 
219. The Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission clarified that whether an attack offered 
a definitive military advantage must be “considered in the context of its relation to the 
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to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian 
objects.”220 Rule 10 of the CIL study clarifies that civilian objects lose their 
protection against attack when they are used for military purposes, i.e., to 
make an effective contribution to military action. API contains the addi-
tional rule at Article 52(3) that “in case of doubt whether an object normal-
ly dedicated to civilian purposes . . . is being used to make an effective con-
tribution to military action, it shall be presumed not to be so used.” Alt-
hough generally well established, this presumption of civilian status is not 
necessarily universally accepted. For example, the drafters of the DoD Law 
of War Manual do not consider this presumption to qualify as CIL.221 
The definition of military objective is relatively simple to apply when it 
comes to obvious military assets, such as a weapon systems, munitions fac-
tory, or barracks. Applying these rules becomes more fraught with respect 
to fungible items or to what some have deemed to be “dual-use objects,” 
such as transportation systems (like the roads and bridges on which the 
tankers travel), energy sources (like oil fields), communications systems, 
                                                                                                                      
armed conflict as a whole at the time of the attack.” Partial Award: Western Front, supra 
note 182, ¶ 151. The destruction of the target at issue in that award, a power station, was 
deemed to offer a military advantage given that it provided power to an area with a major 
port and naval facility. Id. ¶ 121.  
220. Although the United States is not a party to API owing to long-standing objec-
tions to certain provisions on the treaty’s scope and on prisoner of war eligibility, it has 
determined that certain treaty rules—governing fundamental protections and limitations 
on means and methods, for example—constitute CIL. See Michael J. Matheson, The United 
States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 
1949 Geneva Convention, 2 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & 
POLICY 419 (1987) (reproducing remarks of the then-State Department Deputy Legal 
Advisor at the 6th Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference 
on IHL held Jan. 2, 1987); Robert Chesney, Gabor Rona on Article 75 and Additional Protocols 
I and II, LAWFARE (Mar. 11, 2011), https://www.lawfareblog.com/gabor-rona-article-75-
and-additional-protocols-i-and-ii (discussing the Obama administration announcement 
that it would adhere to Article 75 of Protocol I “out of a sense of legal obligation”). That 
many API provisions constitute CIL finds widespread support. See Fausto Pocar, To What 
Extent is Protocol I Customary International Law?, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL LESSONS OF 
NATO'S KOSOVO CAMPAIGN 337 (Andru E. Wall ed., 2002) (Vol. 78, U.S. Naval War 
College International Law Studies). Nonetheless, because many of its coalition partners 
have ratified API, the United States generally adheres to the treaty as a function of in-
teroperability in coalition warfare.  
221. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 106, § 5.5.3.2. 
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and manufacturing plants.222 In 1956, the ICRC drew up Draft Rules for 
the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time 
of War whose annex contained a proposed list of categories of legitimate 
military targets applicable in all conflicts, international and non-
international.223 In addition to obvious targets (the opponent’s armed forc-
es, military installations, supply depots, airfields, etc.), the list included 
more generic objectives, with some caveats, including means of communi-
cations and industries of fundamental importance for the conduct of war. 
Introduced during the Cold War, these Draft Rules were never formalized, 
in part because delegates were reticent about concretizing a discrete list that 
might not accommodate future contingencies. Two decades later, the 
drafters of API took a different approach and codified a set of abstract 
principles to govern targeting. Nonetheless, the Draft Rules continue to 
inform subsequent analyses.224  
The targeting of objects based upon their war-sustaining capability 
alone—without a direct nexus to any concrete military operation—remains 
open to debate.225 The CIL study notes that some States consider economic 
targets that effectively support military operations to be military objectives 
provided their destruction offers a definite military advantage.226 The Unit-
ed States’ position that some economic targets constitute legitimate military 
objectives is derived in part from the Civil War-era cotton blockades erect-
ed to prevent the sale or barter of cotton, which were used by the Confed-
eracy to obtain weapons, ammunition, and ships from British manufactur-
ers.227 It now finds expression in the Military Commission Act at section 
                                                                                                                      
222. Note that most commentators, including the drafters of the Law of War Manual, 
consider all objects to fall into one of two buckets—military objectives or civilian ob-
jects—and reject any notion that there is an intermediate category. Id. 102, § 5.7.1.2. 
223. Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of 
War, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/420?OpenDocument (1956).  
224. See, e.g., IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING 46 
(2009).  
225. See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 AIR FORCE LAW REVIEW 
1, 135–45 (1990) (arguing for the legality of targeting an opponent’s war-sustaining capa-
bilities). 
226. 2 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 217–21 (Jean-Marie 
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005). 
227. United States of America, Practice Relating to Rule 8: Definition of Military Objectives, Sec-
tion G: Economic Installations, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou 
_us_rule8_sectiong (last visited Apr. 18, 2016). U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. 
COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMAND-
ER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ¶ 8.2 (2007). 
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950p(a).228 At the same time, commentators have suggested that even at-
tacks on legitimate military objects may be unlawful if they cause excessive 
long-term damage to an enemy’s economic infrastructure.229 In Syria, this 
concern may be reflected in a desire to disable rather than completely de-
stroy the Syrian facilities, which will be vital to a new regime in the event of 
a (hoped for) political transition.230  
The indispensable contribution made by ISIL’s system of oil produc-
tion and distribution to the group’s military activities seems clear. It pro-
vides ISIL with an indigenous energy source, a vital raw material for its op-
erations, a tool for controlling the populations in the territory it holds, and 
a steady source of hard currency to fund its military aims and terrorist ac-
tivities. Indeed, if stationary elements of ISIL’s oil producing and refining 
system are directly targetable, it is hard to see why tankers are not also 
proper military objectives, since the oil produced is of little use to military 
operations unless it is transported to where it is needed or is otherwise 
monetized. Hindering ISIL’s ability to exploit these resources will offer an 
immediate advantage to the coalition—thwarting any ISIL operations that 
are dependent on oil and oil revenue—in addition to longer-term ad-
vantages emanating from a reduction in ISIL’s purchasing/bartering pow-
er. That said, targeting the tankers does stretch API’s definition of “military 
objective.” This is particularly so given the fungible nature of oil and the 
fact that the tankers may have been dispersing to multiple locations, includ-
ing ISIL military installations, civilian depots, and the Turkish border. 
Tankers carrying oil designated for military use is thus a much easier case 
than tankers carrying oil for export or for civilian consumption. And it is 
impossible to know which tankers are which from the air absent extremely 
granular intelligence. Likewise, the drivers were properly treated as civilians, 
which would impact the proportionality analysis.  
Whether the tankers are lawful military objectives will thus hinge on the 
validity of targeting war-sustaining objects and whether CIL is moving, or 
                                                                                                                      
228. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
229. See, e.g., JUDITH G. GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF 
FORCE BY STATES 118–20 (2004) (arguing that although the U.S.-led coalition in Opera-
tion Desert Storm directed attacks against military objectives, it caused excessive long-
term damage to the Iraqi economic infrastructure to the detriment of the civilian popula-
tion). 
230. Ryan Opsal, Why is the U.S. Reluctant to Bomb ISIS Oil Fields, OILPRICE.COM (Dec. 
2, 2015), http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Middle-East/Why-Is-The-US-Reluctant-To-Bo 
mb-ISIS-Oil-Fields.html.  
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has moved, in this direction.231 There has, as yet, been no major public out-
cry by States (or commentators) about this expanded target set against 
ISIL, although protests—by U.S. coalition partners, other States, or the 
ICRC—may have been lodged behind-the-scenes. Whether this public si-
lence on the part of States can be deemed acquiescence, or even a demon-
stration of opinio juris, remains a doctrinal controversy in international 
law.232 The fear in stretching these abstract concepts too far, of course, is 
that the entire distinction framework will collapse—to the ultimate detri-
ment of the civilian population—and targeting law will regress to the point 
at which “total war” is countenanced and the entire civilian infrastructure is 
considered a legitimate target. Moreover, any argument or rule advanced in 
one conflict will be fair game for other parties to that conflict and may be 
picked up by belligerents in future conflicts as well. That said, limiting prin-
ciples can be identified that will mitigate against any slippery slopes.233  
 
IV. PROSPECTS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
The discussion above has focused on the substantive law applicable to the 
commission of war crimes in Syria. This law can serve a political purpose—
by naming and shaming those responsible for violations and their support-
ers—but the law is at its most potent when it is deployed in criminal pro-
ceedings. In this regard, the international community is not without op-
tions. Theoretically, national courts could exert jurisdiction over these war 
crimes under expansive principles of jurisdiction,234 including universal ju-
                                                                                                                      
231. See Ryan Goodman, Targeting “War-Sustaining” Objects in Non-International Armed 
Conflict, 110 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Agora on President Obama’s 
War Powers Legacy (forthcoming 2016). 
232. David J. Bederman, Acquiescence, Objection and the Death of Customary International 
Law, 21 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 31, 36 (2010) (dis-
cussing when opinio juris can develop through silence); Michael N. Schmitt & Sean Watts, 
State Opinio Juris and International Humanitarian Law Pluralism, 91 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
STUDIES 171 (2015) (urging States to articulate opinio juris or risk the crystallization of 
norms in their silence). The United States has on occasion taken the position that “only 
positive evidence” that States consider themselves bound can satisfy true opinio juris. See 
John B. Bellinger III & William J. Haynes II, A U.S. Government Response to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 INTERNATION-
AL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 443, 447 (2007). 
233. Goodman, supra note 231, at 16. 
234. Exemplifying the application of passive personality jurisdiction, the United 
Kingdom is investigating the death of a UK physician who went to Syria to do humanitar-
ian work. Mark Tran, British Doctor Abbas Khan Unlawfully Killed in Syrian Prison, Jury 
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risdiction,235 or over nationals who have traveled to the region to join the 
fight and who have committed crimes.236 However, not all States can exer-
cise jurisdiction over war crimes committed in NIACs, in part because the 
treaties do not mandate it.237 Nor are State prosecutorial authorities likely to 
act unless a perpetrator is in their midst.238 As such, national courts are not 
apt to take the lead on ensuring accountability for war crimes committed in 
Syria. 
Although the COI, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
and many States favor a referral of the situation in Syria to the ICC,239 the 
ICC has been precluded from acting following the double veto by Russia 
                                                                                                                      
Says, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/27 
/british-doctor-abbas-khan-unlawfully-killed-syria-jury-inquest. 
235. ICRC CIL Study, supra note 17, r. 157 (“States have the right to vest universal ju-
risdiction in their national courts over war crimes” committed in IACs and NIACs.).  
236. For example, in the United States, Shannon Maureen Conley—a U.S. Army Ex-
plorer—is being prosecuted for providing material support to a foreign terrorist organiza-
tion under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which penalizes the provision of material support or re-
sources to a foreign terrorist organization. Alan Gathright, 19-Year-Old Arvada Woman, 
Shannon Maureen Conley, Charged with Aiding ISIS Terror Group, FBI Says, DENVER7 (July 2, 
2014), http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/local-news/19-year-old-colorado-woma 
n-shannon-maureen-conley-charged-with-aiding-terrorist-group-fbi-says07022014.  
237. The United States can assert jurisdiction over certain war crimes committed in 
NIACs, but only if the perpetrator or victim is a U.S. national or member of the U.S. 
armed forces. War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-192, 110 Stat 2104, codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2441. See Beth Van Schaack, United States War Crimes Statute & Sri 
Lanka, JUST SECURITY (May 20, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/10607/united-states-
war-crimes-statute-sri-lanka/ (discussing history and limitations of U.S. war crimes stat-
ute). 
238. Sweden has prosecuted a member of the Free Syrian Army who had been given 
asylum in 2013 but who was later accused of having mistreated a Syrian soldier in his cus-
tody. Dennis Lynch, Syrian Rebel Mouhannad Droubi Sentenced to 5 Years in Swedish Prison for 
War Crimes, IBT (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/syrian-rebel-mouhannad-drou 
bi-sentenced-5-years-swedish-prison-war-crimes-1829388. See also Dutch Find 30 Suspected 
War Criminals among Last Year’s Refugee Wave, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 29, 2016), http://ww 
w.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/29/refugees-europe-dutch-war-criminals-migration.  
239. See, e.g., Report of the Independent International Commission for Inquiry on the 
Syrian Arab Republic, Annex XIV, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/59 (Feb. 5, 2013) (calling for 
an ICC referral). That said, some advocates for international justice have warned against a 
third Security Council referral to the Court, particularly given the lack of financial and 
logistical support provided following the Council’s prior referrals. See Mark Kersten, The 
UN Security Council and the ICC: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (May 
6, 2011), http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/05/06/the-un-security-council-and-the-icc-bet 
ween-a-rock-and-a-hard-place/.  
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and China of a proposed referral resolution.240 Even if a referral is forth-
coming at some point in the future, it is likely that the ICC’s jurisdiction 
will be solely prospective241 and only a handful of indictments would be 
issued against senior figures. Most importantly for this discussion, the ICC 
Prosecutor would by and large be limited to charging intentional attacks on 
civilians and custodial abuses, because the ICC Statute allows for the pros-
ecution of a more limited and fixed set of war crimes in NIACs. These fac-
tors, coupled with the ICC Statute’s robust articulation of the principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege, effectively closes any resort to CIL.242 As a result of 
these statutory features, it would be more difficult for the ICC to adjudi-
cate many of the war crimes that have come to define this conflict—the 
use of chemical and improvised weaponry, sieges and starvation of civilians 
as weapons of war, and indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks on are-
as populated by civilians. As ICC member States consider possible future 
amendments to the ICC Statute, they should consider filling these gaps, 
particularly where the CIL prohibitions are clear and uncontroversial.  
Given these limitations in the ICC Statute and the unlikelihood of a Se-
curity Council referral, if these crimes are to ever be prosecuted, it will have 
to be elsewhere. There is one additional accountability option that has been 
discussed but not yet implemented: an ad hoc regional or international tri-
bunal dedicated to the conflict in Syria.243 Such a tribunal could be estab-
                                                                                                                      
240. Meetings Coverage, Security Council, Referral of Syria to International Criminal 
Court Fails as Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution, 
U.N. Meetings Coverage SC/11407 (May 22, 2014), http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ 
sc11407.doc.htm.  
241. The ICC could exercise jurisdiction retroactively if Syria were to submit an ad 
hoc declaration under Article 12(3) of the ICC Statute accepting such jurisdiction. See 
Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/11 OA 2, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Laurent 
Koudou Gbagbo against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I on Jurisdiction and Stay of 
the Proceedings, ¶ 84 (Dec. 12, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc15 
26463.pdf. Article 12(3) states, “If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this 
Statute is required . . . , that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in question.”  
242. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
243. See Toby Sterling, Push for Syria War Crime Court As Experts Call for International 
Tribunal To Investigate Assad and Rebels, YAHOO! (Sept. 27, 2013), https://www.yahoo.com/ 
news/push-syrian-war-crimes-court-153256619.html?ref=gs; Aryeh Neier, An Arab War-
Crimes Court for Syria, Op-Ed, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com 
/2012/04/05/opinion/an-arab-war-crimes-court-for-syria.html; Beth Van Schaack, A 
Mixed Chamber for Syria: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, JUST SECURITY (May 28, 2014), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/10928/mixed-chamber-syria-idea-time-come/; Beth Van 
Schaack, Alternative Jurisdictional Bases for a Hybrid Tribunal for Syria, JUST SECURITY (May 29, 
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lished by a Security Council resolution or international agreement. It could 
operate retroactively to cover the entire conflict, as well as attacks on 
peaceful protesters that predate the application of IHL.244 Any constitutive 
instrument could overcome the limitations inherent in the IHL treaties, the 
ICC Statute and much domestic law by incorporating the full range of CIL 
war crimes alongside other violations of international criminal law. In the 
past, such international tribunals have proven themselves to be quite adept 
at adjudicating CIL, having developed a range of arguments to overcome 
nullum crimen sine lege defenses raised by defendants.245 Such a tribunal could 
also ensure that direct perpetrators and mid-level commanders with opera-
tional authority do not escape accountability if the ICC ever moves forward 
against those most responsible. International criminal law experts have 
drafted a statute for such a tribunal and the COI,246 and U.S. House of 
Representatives247 have expressed support; however, the international 
community has yet to fully back the proposal,248 in part out of fealty to the 
ICC and in part due to Russia’s intransigence in the Security Council.  
Such an ad hoc tribunal could be created within the judicial system of 
one (or more) of the frontline border States that have been adversely af-
fected by the acute destabilization created by waves of refugees across their 
                                                                                                                      
2014), https://www.JustSecurity.org/10968/alternative-jurisdictional-bases-hybrid-tribuna 
l-syria/.  
244. In this regard, an ad hoc tribunal could also assert jurisdiction over certain his-
torical events that have fueled grievances underlying the current conflict, such as the 1982 
massacre to quell a Sunni rebellion in Hama attributed to Bashar al-Assad’s father. 1982: 
Syria's President Hafez al-Assad Crushes Rebellion in Hama, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 1, 2011), 
http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/from-the-archive-blog/2011/aug/01/hama-
syria-massacre-1982-archive.  
245. See Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of 
Law and Morals, 97 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 119 (2008) (collecting jurisprudence).  
246. Call for Special Tribunal to Investigate War Crimes and Mass Atrocities in Syria, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/17/call-for-
special-tribunal-to-investigate-war-crimes-and-mass-atrocities-in-syria.  
247. See H.R. Con. Res. 121, 113th Cong. (2014) (urging the United States to support 
efforts to collect documentation of international crimes being committed in Syria and urg-
ing the president to direct the UN ambassador to promote the establishment of a Syrian 
war crimes tribunal).  
248. Kathleen A. Doty, Expert Panel Finalizes “Draft Statute for a Syrian Extraordinary 
Tribunal to Prosecute Atrocity Crimes,” AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oct. 3, 
2013), https://www.asil.org/blogs/expert-panel-finalizes-%E2%80%9Cdraft-statute-syria 
n-extraordinary-tribunal-prosecute-atrocity-crimes%E2%80%9D.  
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borders, as well as by cross-border violence from the Syrian war.249 Given 
the degree of domestic instability in Lebanon and Iraq, and the fact that 
Lebanon is already engaged in an experiment in international criminal jus-
tice in the form of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the obvious candi-
dates to host an ad hoc hybrid tribunal are Jordan and Turkey. Another 
alternative would be to establish a regional tribunal in Europe, involving 
the delegation of a range of jurisdictional competencies, including universal 
jurisdiction, where cases pending in European courts could be consolidat-
ed. Operations could be gradually shifted to the region as conditions al-
low.250 Presumably, even NATO or another regional organization such as 
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation or the Arab League could adopt 
this approach. Drawing the ire of Syria, the Arab League has issued strong 
and unprecedented resolutions calling for accountability in Syria and other 
forms of coercive action.251 To date, however, this rhetorical support has 
not translated into concrete institution building in the accountability space. 
Any of these options could be hybridized with the inclusion of Syrian per-
sonnel, drawn from organizations such as the Free Lawyers Association 
and Free Judges Association.252 ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda has en-
couraged this proposal given that a Syria referral to the Court is not likely 
to be forthcoming.253 
There are a number of obvious benefits to the ad hoc tribunal model in 
general and to locating any such tribunal in the region, particularly when it 
comes to the ease of accumulating information that may become evidence 
                                                                                                                      
249. Beth Van Schaack, Options for Accountability in Syria, JUST SECURITY (May 22, 
2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/10736/options-accountability-syria/.  
250. For example, the EU Special Investigative Task Force (SITF) is investigating po-
tential war crimes identified by a January 2011 Council of Europe report prepared by Sen-
ator Dick Marty. The SITF is based partly in Brussels to “reinforce the independence and 
confidentiality of the process.” See About SITF, SITF, http://sitf.eu/index.php/en/about-
sitf (last visited Apr. 18, 2016).  
251. Syria Rejects New Arab League Resolutions, RT (Feb. 13, 2012), https://www.rt.co 
m/news/syria-rejects-arab-league-resolution-139/.  
252. The Free Syrian Lawyers Association and Free Judges Association are networks 
of legal practitioners working to reform the Syrian judicial system. Neil MacFarquhar, A 
Battle for Syria, One Court at a Time, NEW YORK TIMES (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www 
.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/world/middleeast/a-battle-for-syria-one-court-at-a-time.html.  
253. ICC’s Bensouda Would Support Syria Special Tribunal if ICC Path is Blocked, AL 
ARABIYA (May 18, 2014), http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/05/18 
/Interview-ICC-prosecutor-to-examine-alleged-British-crimes-in-Iraq-war.html. 
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in future proceedings.254 Being close to Syria will also facilitate the integra-
tion of Syrian jurists, lawyers, and other staff into the work of the tribunal. 
This lends greater local ownership and thus legitimacy to the process and 
also contributes to building domestic capacity. One additional reason to 
focus on neighboring States as potential hosts might not be so obvious: 
such States may be empowered to exercise jurisdiction on multiple bases 
given the direct effects of the conflict on them.255 To be sure, the principle 
of universal jurisdiction—which empowers all States to prosecute individu-
als accused of the commission of international crimes regardless of any 
nexus to the prosecuting State—is available to any State that is so inclined 
to move forward with prosecutions of individuals responsible for the 
commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity.256 Nonetheless, 
not all States have domesticated universal jurisdiction, and some States re-
main squeamish about advancing the universal jurisdiction norm, perhaps 
all the more so in a new collective form.257 As such, there is an obvious util-
ity to identifying States that can lawfully exercise domestic jurisdiction on 
other, less contentious bases.258 
The effects and protective principles find affinity in the inherent right 
of States to engage in acts in self-defense. The effects principle allows for 
assertions of jurisdiction over criminal conduct that occurs outside its 
territory but causes an effect within its territory.259 The protective principle 
                                                                                                                      
254. Alberto Costi, Viable Transitional Justice Mechanisms to Combat Impunity in Post-
Conflict Situations, 22 NEW ZEALAND UNIVERSITIES LAW REVIEW 213 (2006).  
255. Van Schaack, Alternative Jurisdictional Bases, supra note 243.  
256. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 404 (1988); Christiane Wilke, A Particular Universality: Universal Jurisdiction for 
Crimes Against Humanity in Domestic Courts, 12 CONSTELLATIONS 83 (2005).  
257. The Extraordinary African Chambers, which just prosecuted Hissène Habré of 
Chad, are an example of an international tribunal exercising a form of universal jurisdic-
tion. Agreement on the Establishment of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the 
Senegalese Judicial System between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and the 
African Union art. 1(1), Aug. 22, 2012, 52 I.L.M. 1024 (2013). 
258. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 256, § 402 (outlining bases of jurisdic-
tion). An ad hoc tribunal would exercise a mix of prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction, 
with the latter being most relevant were the tribunal’s constitutive instrument to incorpo-
rate international law directly rather than domestic law provisions prescribing international 
crimes.  
259. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) 
(“[I]t is settled law . . . that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within 
its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders 
which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize.”). 
The test used to be that the conduct was clearly criminal and caused direct, substantial and 
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authorizes the exercise of penal jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts that 
threaten State security, endanger the political or territorial integrity of a 
nation, or undermine the operation of essential governmental functions. 
The theory of these bases of jurisdiction is that the prosecuting State 
cannot be expected to rely upon other States (e.g., the State on whose 
territory the perpetrator acted) to adequately protect its interests. Crimes 
typically subject to protective jurisdiction harm the sovereign itself or 
impair vital governmental functions, although the principle is not limited to 
so-called political crimes (espionage, treason, and subversion). Additional 
crimes commonly subject to effects or protective jurisdiction include 
counterfeiting, immigration and other forms of fraud, trafficking in or 
smuggling of illicit substances or persons, perjury, falsification of official 
documents, etc.260 It has been hypothesized that States should also be 
empowered to invoke these principles of jurisdiction for transnational 
environmental harm261 and that there may be other categories of State 
interests upon which the exercise of effects or protective jurisdiction could 
be based.262  
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law subjects these forms of 
prescriptive jurisdiction to a multifactor rule-of-reason that could be easily 
satisfied by the situation in Syria.263 The scale of the refugee problem attests 
to the reasonableness of Jordan or Turkey, or even European States, 
exercising jurisdiction over crimes resulting in the deportation or flight of 
Syrian refugees, with all the attendant consequences, under either an effects 
or protective theory of jurisdiction. The underlying crimes in question are 
                                                                                                                      
foreseeable effects within the adjudicating State. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965). The third Restatement relaxes 
these requirements. See supra note 256. See generally Kathleen Hixson, Extraterritorial Jurisdic-
tion Under the Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, 12 FORDHAM IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 127 (1988). 
260. Recent Developments, Protective Principle of Jurisdiction Applied to Uphold Statute In-
tended to have Extra-Territorial Effect, 62 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 371 (1962). 
261. Linda M. Paul, Using the Protective Principle to Unilaterally Enforce Transnational Marine 
Pollution Standards, in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 
ON MARINE DEBRIS 1045 (R.S. Shomura & H.L. Godfrcy eds., 1990), http://swfsc.no 
aa.gov/publications/TM/SWFSC/NOAA-TM-NMFS-SWFSC-154_P1045.PDF. 
262. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
462 (8th ed. 2008).  
263. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 256, § 403. This reasonableness test is not 
uniformly accepted. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 
909, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“[N]o rule of international law [holds] that a ‘more reasonable’ 
assertion of jurisdiction mandatorily displaces a ‘less reasonable’ assertion.”).  
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well-established, and the Syrian regime (and any individual defendants) 
would have no basis to object to an extraterritorial prosecution. In any 
case, there are unlikely to be any competing exercises of jurisdiction in light 
of the continued impunity of potential defendants in Syria and the 
anticipated multilateral support for any regional tribunal; thus, principles of 
comity offer no reason to pause. As the international community considers 
the ad hoc tribunal option, the protective and effects principles offer 
grounds to vest jurisdiction in those States most harmed by the conflict in 
neighboring Syria, which would now also include States of the European 
Union that struggle with the refugee crisis. 
There is some precedent for applying the protective principle in the 
war crimes context. Following World War II, occupation courts relied up-
on the protective principle to prosecute extraterritorial conduct against the 
interests of the prosecuting State. For example, in Joyce v. Director of Public 
Prosecutions,264 the defendant (a U.S. citizen carrying a fraudulently obtained 
British passport) was prosecuted for treason for providing aid and comfort 
to the enemy in the form of propaganda broadcast in Germany. 
In Kawakita v. United States, the defendant was prosecuted for treason for 
torturing Allied prisoners of war who were being forced to work in a Japa-
nese factory.265 Likewise, Israel invoked the protective principle (among 
other jurisdictional grounds) to justify its abduction and prosecution of 
Adolf Eichmann, even though the State of Israel did not exist at the time 
Eichmann acted.266 
A similar tribunal model is under consideration for the downing of Ma-
laysia Air Flight 17 (MH-17) as a way of circumventing Russia’s veto of a 
Dutch/Malaysian proposal to establish an international tribunal.267 If such a 
Lockerbie-style tribunal268 were to move forward, the most affected States 
would include Ukraine, as the territorial and potentially nationality State; 
Malaysia, as the State of registration as well as the State of nationality of the 
                                                                                                                      
264. Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1946] A.C. 347 (HL) (U.K.), 
http://uniset.ca/other/cs3/joyce.html.  
265. 343 U.S. 717 (1952). 
266. Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18 (Dist. 
Ct. 1961). See Santiago M. Villalpando, Eichmann Case, OXFORD PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (last updated Feb. 2007), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/97801992 
31690/law-9780199231690-e783?rskey=rQbNdU&result=4&prd=OPIL.  
267. MH17 Crash: Russia Vetoes UN Resolution for International Tribunal, BBC (July 29, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33710088.  
268. Michael Scharf, The Lockerbie Model of Transfer of Jurisdiction, in 2 INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 525(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3d ed. 2008).  
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victims; and the Netherlands (and others), also invoking the passive per-
sonality principle (two-thirds of those killed were Dutch). It is contemplat-
ed these States could, in essence, “pool” their respective jurisdictional 
competencies.269 Such a tribunal for MH-17 could also be premised on the 
collective exercise of universal jurisdiction if the attack amounted to a war 
crime or an act of terrorism subject to universal jurisdiction.270 In the ab-
sence of a compliant host State in the region, a group of concerned States 
could conceivably revert to the Nuremberg model and create among them-
selves an ad hoc tribunal outside of the United Nations framework that 
could be empowered to exercise international jurisdiction or even a dele-
gated form of domestic jurisdiction (e.g., universal, passive personality, ef-
fects, and/or protective). Concerns about creating a precedent that could 
be employed in other contexts may be hindering progress on this front. 
  
V. CONCLUSION  
 
Notwithstanding the extensive war crimes being committed in Syria, exist-
ing tribunals—international or domestic—may have difficulty issuing 
charges for many of the most defining breaches of IHL given the lack of 
positive law governing NIAC war crimes. Most of the IHL treaties dis-
cussed are not applicable to the conflict in Syria because it remains—at 
least for now—a non-international armed conflict. Even if an ICC referral 
is forthcoming, the Court may not be able to entertain many war crimes 
charges of direct relevance to the situation in Syria, such as the deliberate 
starvation of the civilian population or the use of chemical weapons. Ra-
ther, a strict reading of the ICC Statute would limit the prosecutor to 
charging intentional attacks on civilians, civilian objects, and other protect-
ed persons and things—all serious charges to be sure, but these characteri-
zations do not fully capture the particular horror that is Syria. This conclu-
                                                                                                                      
269. The nationality of the perpetrators of the downing of MH-17 is unknown, which 
complicates the question of whether Russia’s assent would be required as a legal or practi-
cal matter for any tribunal to be established, especially given that the acts in question may 
be subject to universal jurisdiction. 
270. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation art. 5, 974 U.N.T.S. 178. The so-called Montreal Convention obliges States par-
ties to exercise universal jurisdiction over attacks on civil aircraft when the perpetrator is 
present in the State’s territory. Id., art. 5(2) (“Each Contracting State shall likewise take 
such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over [treaty] offences . . . in 
the case where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite 
him.”). 
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sion demonstrates that the ICC Statute—as a treaty—has frozen IHL in 
time in a way that does not, and will not, reflect international law’s inexo-
rable normative development.271  
The difficulty of charging the whole range of war crimes is not fatal to 
criminal accountability for Syria, of course. Many of the forms of violence 
discussed above may also constitute crimes against humanity. An attack 
involving chemical weapons could be charged as the crimes against human-
ity of murder, extermination or the catch-all “other inhumane acts,”272 for 
example, without reference to IHL so long as the assault formed part of an 
attack against a civilian population.273 As formulated in the ICC Statute, the 
crime against humanity of extermination covers not only the mass killing of 
civilians, but also intentionally inflicting conditions of life “calculated to 
bring about the destruction of part of a population,” including “the depri-
vation of access to food and medicine” so long as death results.274 This def-
inition would enable the prosecution of “famine crimes”—the deliberate 
use of hunger “as a tool of extermination to annihilate troublesome popu-
lations”275 and the deliberate withholding of humanitarian aid. Likewise, the 
crime against humanity of deportation has prosecutorial potential given the 
migrant crisis in the region and Europe. The crime of deportation includes 
the forcible transfer276 of persons to another State “by expulsion or other 
coercive acts.”277  
                                                                                                                      
271. ICC Statute, supra note 15, art. 10 (“Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as 
limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for pur-
poses other than this Statute.”). 
272. This is defined as the infliction of “great suffering, or serious injury to body or to 
mental or physical health, by means of an inhumane act” that is of a similar nature and 
gravity to the other crimes against humanity. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 143, art. 
7(1)(k).  
273. It may not be possible to charge the use of such weapons against combatants, 
however. See Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 
311 (Int’l. Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2008) (concluding that combat-
ants who are hors de combat can be the victims of crimes against humanity so long as they 
are injured as part of an attack on a civilian population); Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Case No. 
IT-95-13/1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 41–43 (Int’l. Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia May 5, 
2009) (finding combatants had been singled out and so their death could not be charged as 
a crime against humanity).  
274. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 143, art. 7(1)(b). 
275. David Marcus, Famine Crimes in International Law, 97 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 245, 247 (2003). 
276. The Elements of Crimes makes clear that the term “forcibly”  
 
is not restricted to physical force, but may include threat of force or coercion, such as that 
caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power 
 
 
 
Mapping War Crimes in Syria          Vol. 92 
  
 
339 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notwithstanding the role that the prohibition of crimes against human-
ity can play in ensuring accountability for international crimes committed in 
Syria, the law governing war crimes should be central to any accountability 
effort. A tribunal whose prosecutor has resort to CIL prohibitions applica-
ble to all armed conflicts would be in a better position to redress the full 
assortment of harms suffered by the Syrian people, reach a broader range 
of perpetrators and contribute to the normative development of the law of 
war crimes. An ad hoc tribunal dedicated to Syria offers the most promis-
ing avenue for war crimes accountability, if only the political will existed 
for its creation.  
 
                                                                                                                      
against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive 
environment. 
 
Id. at 246 n.12.  
277. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 143, art. 7(1)(d).  
